Sigmund Freud, unlike Jean-Paul Sartre, had a divided view of consciousness. Freud divided it into three functional parts: id, ego, and superego. He saw the id as the deepest level of the unconscious, dominated by the pleasure principle, with its object the immediate gratification of instinctual drives. The superego, originating in the child through identification with parents, and in response to social pressures, functions as an internal censor to repress the urges of the id. The ego, on the other hand, is seen as a part of the id modified by contact with the external world. It is a mental agent mediating among three contending forces: the outside demands of social pressure or reality, libidinal demands for immediate satisfaction arising from the id, and the moral demands of the superego. Although considered only partly conscious, the ego constitutes the major part of what is commonly referred to as consciousness.

For simplicity’s sake and to make Freud’s conception comparable to Sartre’s, I will collapse the superego into the ego and only talk of it and the id, as Sartre does. So we have left the id, which essentially drives and determines the actions in the ego while it itself remains beneath the surface, and the ego, which is driven by the id and yet disconnected from it; basically a bifurcated view of consciousness with each part acting without the knowledge of the other; he posits consciousness, and below it, unconsciousness. To put it in Sartre’s language: “By the distinction between the “id” and the “ego,” Freud has cut the psychic whole in two.  I am the ego but I am not the id.  I hold no privileged position in relation to my unconscious psyche. … I stand in relation to my “id” in the position of the Other.”

Sartre’s major contention with Freud’s theory is the bifurcation itself. Sartre saw consciousness as one whole unit, as something inseparable, and to speak of it otherwise was ludicrous, as he attempted to show in “Bad Faith”, a chapter in his book Being and Nothingness.

Sartre begins by first marking the distinction between lying to another and lying to oneself, or committing an act of bad faith, as Sartre puts it. A lie directed outward from a person and toward another implies the fact that the liar is actually in complete possession of the truth which he is hiding. A person cannot lie about what he is ignorant of, he must know the truth. As Sartre says, “The ideal description of the liar would be a cynical consciousness, affirming truth within himself, denying it in his words, and denying that negation as such…”.

Sartre goes on to describe bad faith and the fundamental difference between it and a projected lie toward another. The difference lies in the fact that in the case of an act of bad faith the lie is directed toward the self, not the other. In the case of a projected lie there was an apparent duality, between the liar and the one to whom the lie was told. But on the other hand, in the case of bad faith, the duality has been removed; bad faith implies the unity of a single consciousness, not two, as in the case of the liar and the lied to, and pertaining to Freud, the unconscious and the conscious.

Having established this, Sartre begins to examine the psychoanalytic method, which relies on the bifurcation of consciousness, and begins to formulate some of its problematic implications. For example, Freud reports that during psychoanalysis, when he is near to approaching the truth of some repression, the patient shows defiance, may refuse to speak, exaggerate about his dreams, or even remove himself entirely from the psychoanalytic treatment. Under a divided view of consciousness this behavior doesn’t seem to make sense. The ego, as an outsider to the id, and in just the same position as the doctor, as an outsider to the id, has no privileged position. The ego cannot be the source of the resistance. In fact the ego, as analogous to the doctor, would be more apt to uncover any hidden desire, as that is the point of psychoanalysis. Sartre concludes by saying, “In this case it is no longer possible to resort to the unconscious to explain bad faith; it is there in full consciousness…”, in a single consciousness.

Though, it could be contended that the source of resistance actually comes from the complex which the psychoanalyst is trying to uncover. But Sartre discusses this too, positing the complex as a collaborator of the psychoanalyst, not an enemy, because it desires to express itself in clear consciousness and because it plays tricks on the censor (the patient as repressing the complex) and seeks to elude it. He goes on to say that the only level on which the resistance can be found is on the censor because “it alone can comprehend the questions or the revelations of the psychoanalyst as approaching more or less near to the real drives which it strives to repress-it alone because it alone knows what it is repressing”.  Here we can see that the censor must be able to be aware of the repressions. He must be able to discern the condemned drives. And by discernment of these drives, must we not infer that, instead of disparate sections of consciousness, we find it more plausible to posit a single consciousness that is capable of discernment? It seems so.

The next section begins to give further credence to Sartre’s theory that there is a single consciousness. We have seen that the discernment of the repressed drive by the censor implies unity of consciousness, but more evidence may be found in the fact that the censor must also recognize them as to be repressed; it must be aware of the information to be repressed and as to be repressed before it could actually be repressed.

Sartre summarizes well:

“All knowing is consciousness of knowing. Thus the resistance of the patient  implies on the level of the censor and awareness of the thing repressed as such, a comprehension of the end toward which the questions of the psychoanalyst are leading…These various operations in their turn imply that the censor is conscious of itself”

Now that we’ve established a unity of consciousness with respect to repressing complexes and uncovering them, we’ll return to the question of bad faith, or of one lying to oneself. This consciousness, capable of discerning and repressing complexes, is an example of this. This consciousness “must be the consciousness of being conscious of the drive to be repressed, but precisely in order to not be conscious of it. What does this mean if not that the censor is in bad faith?”. The censor is lying to himself and is therefore in bad faith, as Sartre has defined it, and is the product of a single consciousness, without which bad faith would not be possible.

Freud has rejected the unity of consciousness and in doing so he is looking for some magical casual connection between distant phenomena. Sartre likens it to sympathetic magic which, like the operation of a voodoo doll, depends on leaps across objects and space to unite two disparate objects. It could even be compared to Descartes’ problem of the soul affecting the body; how could something of such different compositions and natures be united?

To summarize, if Freud is correct in his dividing of consciousness into the ego and the id, then bad faith is not possible due to the fact that, to qualify for an act being in bad faith, one must deceive himself and to separate consciousness is to separate the self. But, as Sartre argues, bad faith is possible and does exist, as we see in the examples of the young lover, the waiter, and the homosexual. Therefore, the Freudian conception of consciousness must be incorrect and must be replaced by another, Sartre’s.

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• The Speechwriter

In Barbara Stoler Miller’s (1995) translation of Patanjali’s classic Yoga Sutra, themes that Forman discusses in his essay: Mystical Consciousness, the Innate Capacity, and Perennial Psychology (1998, 3-42), find an easy ground for a comparative study. The ultimate goal of Patanjali’s yoga is to be freed from the control material and ego-based nature has over the human spirit through intense physical and mental practices. Miller writes that Patanjali: “…seeks a new perspective on the nature of knowing—a way to clear the mind of accumulated experiences and memories that bind us to a world of pain” (preface, ix). The eightfold path elaborated in the Yoga Sutra leads the seeker through progressive stages of disciplined physical and mental training in order to slowly unravel layers of ignorance and delusion which serve to bind the true spirit (purusa) within to the phenomenal world (prakrti) (6).

Forman’s intention is not to lay out such a path for his readers, but rather to draw out these ideas to counter the “constructivist” theory that all experience, including mystical experience, is mediated. He draws on a number of both eastern and western mystical and philosophical texts and his own experience to give substance to the theory that the actual moment of “pure consciousness experience”is unmediated because all thinking and modes of conceptualization, which he associates with language and other means of mediation, are said to stop (7). Both Patanjali and Forman speak of the necessity of direct experience: “pure consciousness” or “nirbija samadhi”can not be known rationally or by any sort of objective knowledge. It transcends regular modes of thought and association and yet, paradoxically, it is innate; always present but veiled by illusion and ignorance.

Central to Forman’s entire position is his concept of “knowledge-by-identity”. He writes: “Both knowledge-about and knowledge-by-acquaintance (adapted from James’ theory) come through a complex set of epistemological processes involving memory, expectation, language, and concept use. However, the knowledge-by-identity that I am and have been conscious is a, and perhaps the only, form of knowledge that is not ‘processed through’ these extremely complex epistemological ways” (22, parentheses mine). Knowledge-by-acquaintance is the result of a direct, sensory experience, while knowledge-about is the result of comparison, association and analogy. It involves analytical modes of thinking which require language and incorporate cultural experience (20). Knowledge-by-identity, in contrast, can’t be known linguistically or through the senses. It is so intimately present that one is not even aware it is there and it is only through this knowledge that one can know what awareness or consciousness is: “Other than the knowledge I have of my own awareness, I know of not other case of knowledge-by-identity” (22).

The “pure consciousness experience”, thus, is a direct encounter or awareness of that which one is: “I know it as a unity that can become aware of any thought, perception, or what have you because I am this unity” (23). It is through one’s own consciousness that one comes to experience, feel, know or understand everything coherently. It “ties together” all thought and memory but it is not any of these things and can not be known through them. It is beyond the purview of conceptual knowledge: “The mechanics of how a consciousness knows itself or ties itself together continuously through time is something we can not possibly know” (24).

Forman places emphasis on the usefulness of meditative procedures as means to come to know or experience one’s innate pure consciousness. He writes that they: “…encourage one to gradually lay aside and temporarily cease employing language and concepts. If one truly forgets all concepts and beliefs for some period then those concepts and beliefs cannot play a formative role in creating the mystical experience(s)” (7). Forman claims here that the pure consciousness experience necessitates “forgetting” the concepts and structures that serve to mediate more common experience.

The Yoga Sutras are concerned with the methods by which one can attain an experience that is akin to what Foreman is describing. The purpose and goal of the discipline of yoga is explained in the opening aphorisms: “Yoga is the cessation of the turnings of thought. When thought ceases, the spirit stands in its true identity as observer to the world. Otherwise, the observer identifies with the turnings of thought” (1:2-4). It is made clear that there are at least two ways of experiencing the world. One’s spirit is either engaged in the ceaseless “turnings of thought” and identified with material reality and its cycles of cause and effect or it is removed from these bounds and becomes the “observer”—rather than a participator. Cessation is possible through “practice and dispassion” (1:12). One must actively engage in the rigorous effort to still the mind which, before tamed and calm, is clouded by illusion. This effort, or “yoking”, is yoga.

Yoga concerns itself with detaching one’s identity from the material world to realize a supreme quality within that is not immediately perceptible. Through dedication to the path of yoga, one gradually becomes aware of the subtle levels of not only the material world but, importantly, how it is reflected inwardly.

Through this unfolding, one comes to know the nature of and the interaction between the two complex and paradoxical principles of material nature (prakrti), and spirit (purusa). Purusa is related to what Forman spoke of as consciousness. It is independent and distinct from material and mental processes and yet without it, neither thought nor activity (aspects of prakrti)would be conscious. Foreman writes: “Awareness makes a thought or a perception an experience: we can have no experience without being conscious of it. Purusa, sheer awareness, is thus innate, part of the essential machinery of having any experience” (11). Through yoga one begins to distinguish between prakrti and purusa and gains the ability to break the connection, which is taken for granted, between them. A direct realization of purusa is thus perhaps equatable with Forman’s “pure consciousness experience”. Just as Forman indicates that consciousness, in its purest form, is realized through efforts to let go of concepts, attachments and other “intentional” constraints (30), the goal of the Patanjali’s progressive eightfold path is to realize directly, without intellectual, rational or even intuitive activity, the freedom of purusa.

Foreman indicates that the realization of pure consciousness involves a “transformative process” (30). It requires effort or, at the very least, entails movement from one mode of conscious existence to another. The “advanced states”, he writes, “result from something innate” (31), the realization of something that is a critical part of our own inherent nature. He writes: “I have been conscious throughout my life; the mystical experience is only a coming to an uncompounded experience of that” (31). PCE is the result of “forgetting” the conventions of language, image and other content-full stimuli. It is not, ultimately, realized or known through any means or practice; it is simply seeing “purely”, without the filters of language and culture, for the first time.

Through the meditative practices and contemplative thought experiments Patanjali prescribes,the same intimate “transformative” realization is ultimately achieved. One must pass beyond the bounds of material nature and learn to watch, instead of engage, in the games of the mind and intellect. It is a progressive, unlearning process: “When the turnings of thought stop, a contemplative poise occurs, in which thought, like a polished crystal, is colored by what is nearby—whether perceiver, process of perception, or object of perception” (1:41). Through “contemplative poise” one becomes aware through intuitive means or by the intellect, that prakrti and purusa are distinct. This “seed-bearing contemplation” (sabija-samadhi) (1:41-46) leaves traces and still involves cognitive processes but important wisdom is gained by it. “A subliminal impression generated by wisdom stops the formation of other impressions. When the turnings of thought cease completely, even wisdom ceases, and contemplation bears no seeds” (1:50-51). The “tranquility” that follows the “intuitive cognition” of seed-bearing contemplation (1:47) sets the ground for an even deeper state. The seed of wisdom gained by sabija-samadhi stop the formation of new thought or impressions. Miller writes that thought, recorded memory and even intuition “have no relevance to the realization of the state of pure contemplation” (nirbija-samadhi) (43)—even the wisdom gained in sabija-samadhi dissolves. Rational knowledge, made of prakrti, is necessary to proceed on the path, but almost in a backwards cycle of de-evolution. One strips prakrti of its external components until it no longer exists—all that is left is purusa which itself dissolves. One becomes, essentially, primordially uncreated and unbound from the fetters of time and space. On a mundane level, knowledge-about and knowledge-by-acquaintance are subsumed by knowledge-by-identity which is the witness of consciousness just as the play of prakrti finds its resting place in purusa.

Forman emphasizes the idea that PCE is only a direct experience of the subtlest level of consciousness that “comes with the equipment of being human” (34). It is realized through a process of “letting go, an emptying of the self, a forgetting of language and sensation” (34). The Yoga Sutras prescribe just such a process. Patanjali prescribes methods for the “withdrawal of the senses”(2:54-55). Through discipline in yogic practices, especially posture and breath control (2:46-53), one can gain control over the senses and prepare the body and mind for the more advanced stages of yoga. The various levels of contemplation dig deeply into the constructs of the mind to expose the mechanisms that construct false identities and bind us to cycles of desire, anger and delusion. One uses thought to overcome thought, to transcend it and all forms of knowledge which inhibit apprehension of the true nature of the spirit.

Absolute spiritual integration is the ultimate goal of both yoga and PCE. Experience seems to be at the heart of both discourses. One engages oneself in the process of de-evolution and integration, but even this engagement must ultimately be abandoned. One must truly let go of all of the mental and physical constructs that confine one’s awareness to only one, limited mode of experience.

Miller, Barbara Stoler, 1996. Yoga: Discipline of Freedom. University of California Press, CA

Forman, Robert K.C. 1998. “Mystical Consciousness, the Innate Capacity, and Perennial Psychology ” in: The Innate Capacity. New York: Oxford

Related

• The Psychedelic Experience: LSD and Buddhist Practices
• Sartre’s Critique of the Freudian Explanation of Bad Faith
• Patanjali’s Yoga Darsana – The Hatha Yoga Tradition

Memory is a tool on which many people rely heavily every day. How and what is remembered plays a significant role in determining how people act in their daily lives (Araya, Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003). It is important to understand how memory works as a way of understanding more about people in general, and specifically about how the brain stores information. With this information people can be helped to expand and build memory, those with learning disabilities can be treated, and eyewitness testimony can be filtered for accuracy (Dysart, Lindsay, Hammond & Dupuis, 2001). Understanding memory has and will continue to influence many disciplines and help uncover the myriad mysteries of the mind (McNamara & Wong, 2003).

Researchers have spent decades studying the mechanisms of memory (Ho, Cheung, & Chan 2003). There are several different types of memory, such as episodic, which allows people to remember specific events with striking clarity. Implicit memories are pieces of information people know, but are not aware of the source. Conversely, explicit memories are pieces of information people can remember and they can also remember when and how they acquired that information.

Most researchers believe that a piece of knowledge must pass through a series of “gates” before it is permanently stored in memory (Ward & Loftus, 1985). The first of these gates is called working memory, where objects that are being attended to at the present moment are stored. Objects in working memory can remain there anywhere from two seconds to several minutes before either being forgotten or passing though the next gate, known as short term memory.

Short term memory is similar to working memory, and not all researchers agree on the distinction between working memory and short term memory (Hinson, Jameson & Whitney, 2003) However, short term memory is considered to be the staging area where the fate of a piece of information is decided; it will either fail to be encoded as a memory, and so be forgotten, or it will pass into permastore, where long term memories are held. Approximately 7 items can be stored in short term memory at one time.

With this knowledge, researchers have been able to test memory skills under a variety of conditions and in many circumstances, to arrive at a better understanding of memory skills and function. In order to attain this knowledge, most of the research in memory has been aimed at short term or working memory (Hinson, Jameson & Whitney, 2003). For example, researchers know that information to which people are exposed in passing can sometimes remain, subconsciously, in memory and can influence future decisions (Bushman & Bonacci, 2002). This information is frequently used in advertising, where advertisers hope that frequent exposure to their products will prompt more purchases at the store. Extensive market research has shown that consumers are indeed influenced by this exposure (Bushman & Bonacci, 2002).

In the 2003 study by Hinson, Jameson and Whitney, it was found that individual differences in working memory are related to decision making that favors short-term over long-term consequences. People with more efficient working memories were better able to process and weigh the differences between a short-term reward, which appeared better at first glance, and a long-term reward, which was actually the better choice. There were some differences noted in the working memory processes of the individuals who chose the long-term reward.

One of the most popular areas of memory research is that of eyewitness testimony and identification (Dysart, Lindsay, Hammond & Dupuis, 2001). In a study by Dysart and colleagues (2001), there was significant evidence to show that eyewitnesses who had been shown mug shots of suspects prior to participating in a lineup were more likely to choose a suspect to whom they had been previously exposed. The implications of this research are monumental: A suspect can be incarcerated on the basis of testimony that may have inadvertently been planted in memory by the viewing of mug shots. With this research, the lives of many innocent people may be spared.

Another study on eyewitness performance by Ward and Loftus (1985) showed that when two people witness the same event, their memories will be different. They also found that people with certain personality traits were more likely to me misled by false information.

Verbal and visual memory are two more types of memory. Verbal refers to remembering associated with words, like how many words a person can remember when they hear them read aloud. Visual memory refers to the amount and accuracy of recollections having to do with visual stimuli, such as the details of the slide show in the current study. It has been found that verbal memory is affected by interference in working memory (Woodman, Vogel & Luck, 2001). For example, if a person is asked to remember a series of words that are read aloud, and then must complete a task that fills their working memory, they are much less likely to accurately recall the words. Since verbal and visual memory are closely related, logic would assume that the same rule would hold true for visual memory.

To this end, it is hypothesized that the more interference that is present between the stimulus and the desired response, the less accurate the participants’ responses will be. Group 1, which has only a time delay, should have the most accurate responses, and there should be a significant difference between the accuracy of the responses of group 2, which had the easy task interference condition, and group 3, which had the difficult task interference condition.

Method

Participants

Participants were 17 undergraduate students enrolled in the Thursday lab section of experimental psychology at Rutgers University. Group 1, the control group, consisted of 5 students, while groups 2 and 3 consisted of 6 students. Students were randomly assigned to groups as they entered the classroom. Students who participated were given class credit for their participation in this and several other experiments.

Procedure

It should be noted that this study was conducted after a very short study in this same lab period. Participants may have had less interest in this study because they were told it was the longer of the two, or they may have been impatient to leave. Participants were shown a brief slide show of a man visiting several stores, examining merchandise, and shoplifting several items. Group 1, the control group, was then required to sit quietly for 5 minutes, while group 2 completed an easy task and group 3 completed a difficult task. The easy task was to look for pictures of items in a newspaper and to record the page number on which they were found on a questionnaire. The difficult task was to complete the crossword puzzle in the newspaper and writing a brief assessment of one’s puzzle solving abilities.

After the 5 minute period, all participants read a narrative that told the same basic story as the slide show, but with some misleading and some reinforcing statements.

After the narrative, another 5 minute period followed in which group 1 was required to sit quietly, group 2 completed an easy task, and group 3 completed a difficult task. The easy task was again identifying pictures in a newspaper, while the difficult task consisted of answering questions based on information embedded in different newspaper articles.

After the second 5 minute period, all participants were tested on their memory of specific details from the slide show.

Results

The data indicated support for the hypothesis that the group with the most interference between the slide show and the questions would yield the most inaccurate responses. However, group 2 (easy task), out-performed both group 1 (control group), and group 3 (hard task). It appears that when slightly challenged, participants perform at their optimal level.

Group 1 performed better than Group 3, but not as well as Group 2. This may be attributable to the fact that the participants of Group 1 had nothing with which to occupy their minds except their own thoughts, and they may have grown bored and disinterested during the two periods of down time. Group 3 did have the fewest accurate responses, due to the fact that their tasks were the most challenging and required the most abstract thought. These results are in keeping with the hypothesis that, with too much interference, the brain is unable to store a lot of information in working memory. However, the hypothesis did not anticipate that no interference at all may in fact prove more distracting than a small amount of interference.

Though our experiment yielded results which seem to be an accurate demonstration of the capacities of memory, further research is highly suggested. Due to the fact that this lab class has only minimal students and several were absent during the experiment, the results may not be as reliable as possible. Having a large sample group is an important factor for any experiment. Because these experimental groups were so small, it would be advisable to try and re-create these results with a larger, more diverse subject pool.

In the questionnaire regarding the slide show, the questions were classified as reinforced: items in the slide show were mentioned correctly in the narrative (e.g. yellow candle); misled: items in the slide show were mentioned incorrectly in the narrative (e.g. white candle); slide only: items in the slide show were not mentioned in the narrative; and neutral: items in the slide show were mentioned in the slide show, but with no modifiers (e.g. candle). There were four (4) misleading questions, eight (8) slide only questions, four (4) neutral questions, and four (4) reinforced questions.

All groups performed the same or better with reinforced questions than with any other questions. Group 1, the control group, had a 90% overall accuracy for reinforced questions, 87.5% for slide only, 85% for neutral questions, and only 40% for misleading questions. Group 2, the easy task group, had 87.5% overall accuracy for both the reinforced and slide only questions, 79.2% for neutral questions, and 66.7% for misleading questions. Group 3, the hard task group, had 95.8% overall accuracy for reinforced questions, 85. 4% for slide only questions, 70.8% for neutral questions, and only 33.3% for misleading questions. Out of all the groups, group 3 had the best overall accuracy for reinforced questions, and the worst overall accuracy for misleading questions.

Group 2 had the least variance, a 20.8% difference, in their overall accuracy between the misleading and reinforced questions, group 1 had a 40% variance, and group 3 had 62.5%, the most variance.

All 3 groups rated themselves similarly to one another on confidence judgments, and across all categories of questions. Across all 20 questions, Group 2 rated themselves an overall confidence of 87.81%, Group 1 rated themselves an overall confidence of 88.48%, and Group 3 rated themselves an overall confidence of 88.57%. All groups rated their performance within 1% of each other. However, Group 3 (hard task), who yielded the least accurate responses, rated themselves highest in confidence. Group 2, (easy task), who yielded the most accurate responses, rated themselves lowest in confidence, and Group 1 (control group) rated themselves right in the middle.

Group 3 showed an overall accuracy for confidence judgments of 71.35%, Group 1 showed 75.63%, and Group 2 showed 80.21%. Group 2 did nearly 10% better than group 3 and nearly 5% better than group 1.

Conclusion

A most interesting phenomenon lies in the results of the confidence judgments. It appears that participants have no true idea of their actual accuracy in answering questions. Regardless of their actual accuracy, all 3 groups rated themselves fairly high on their confidence levels, and extremely close to one another. These results are in keeping with the findings of Elizabeth Loftus (1986), who demonstrated that individuals’ confidence of their answers has no bearing on their actual results.

It appears that, for working memory to function at an optimal level, some interference or distraction is desirable. When individuals are forced to concentrate too avidly on a task, they appear to lose interest and become easily distracted from their goal. When there is too much interference or distraction, however, the individual is unable to recall all the information from working or short term memory, probably due to the fact that they are forced to channel their concentration almost completely into other areas. Therefore, the data lead to the conclusion that a low level of distraction has the capability of driving the memory to achieve greater results.

It would be interesting to try to replicate these results with a larger group of participants, and also to create more distinction between the difficulties of each group’s task. Doing so may yield more detailed information on the intricacies of working memory.

Related

Ponty then goes on to discuss more specifically why physiology alone, or why psychology alone cannot account for the phenomenon of phantom limbs. Rather Ponty attempts to understand how each complements the other; the body the mind and the mind the body.

He begins with the example of a man who has lost his leg. Stimulus is applied to, instead of the leg, the path between the stump and the man’s brain. It is then realized that the man will experience, once again, the feeling of his leg. Why is this? Ponty begins with the physiological, mechanistic approach, but soon reveals its shortcomings.

“What has modern physiology to say about this [phenomenon]? Anesthesia with cocaine does not do away with the phantom limb, and there are cases of phantom limbs without amputation as a result of brain injury. Finally, the imaginary limb is often found to retain the position in which the real arm was at the moment of injury” (428). This leads Ponty to the conclusion that physiology alone cannot account for this phenomenon; the psychic realm must also play a role.

He believes the phenomenon of phantom limb can be understood more completely if we are able to understand a similar phenomenon, that of anosognosia. Anosognosia is the phenomenon that occurs when a patient retains a limb, but refuses to acknowledge its presence. Ponty explains these patients “who systematically ignore their paralyzed right hand, and hold out their left hand when asked for their right, refer to their paralyzed arm as ‘a long, cold snake’, which rules out any hypothesis of anesthesia and suggests one in terms of the refusal to recognize the deficiency” (428). This phenomenon clearly demands a psychological explanation. But is a psychological explanation enough to account for phantom limbs? Ponty doesn’t think so: “…no psychological explanation can overlook the fact that the severance of the nerves abolished the phantom limb. What has to be understood, then, is how the psychic determining factors and the physiological conditions gear into each other.”

But this phenomenon cannot be understood simply as a combination of the psychic and the physical forces. It must be understood in terms of the person, as the living body rising toward the world with its various projects in mind as it does so; it must be understood as the relationship between the subjective person and the objective world.

Ponty then applies this view of the subject/object to the physiological and psychological explanations, pointing out their essential shortcomings. Along the way he begins to borrow an idea from psychoanalysis, the idea of repression. A purely physiological explanation of anosognosia and the phantom limb could be conceived of as the repression of what Ponty calls “interoceptive” stimulations. According to this idea, anosognosia would be the “absence of a fragment of representation which ought to be given, since the corresponding limb is there; the phantom limb is the presence of the part of the representation of the body which should not be given, since the corresponding limb is not there” (430). But this makes no sense, if a part does not exist it should not be represented, and vice versa. But the psychological account doesn’t do much better.

In the psychological account, the phantom limb is viewed as a memory or a perception, while anosognosia is forgetfulness or a negative perception. In this case the phantom limb is viewed as an actual positive perception of an entity which does not exist, while anosognosia is thought of as the absence of an actual presence, which, again, makes little sense.

Ponty resolves these issues by realizing that in both cases we are relying on the outside world and its inherent characteristics, which is problematic. He says, “In both cases we are imprisoned in the categories of the objective world, in which there is no middle term between presence and absence. In reality the anosognosic is not simply ignorant of the existence of his paralyzed limb: he can evade his deficiency only because he knows…what he does not want to face, otherwise he would not have been able to avoid it successfully” (430).

This is a critical point Ponty is trying to make. Just as in the psychoanalytic tradition, the patient can only be aware of and act on the basis of what he or she knows. In the case of the phantom limb patient and the anosognosic, each is aware of the deficiency and is attempting to make up for it on what could be considered the subconscious level. The anosognosic denies knowledge of the paralyzed limb in order not to feel the pain of the handicap, while the phantom limb patient demands that his exists for the same reason, so as not to be rendered handicapped.

This is what Ponty means when he says, “The phantom arm is not the representation of the arm, but the ambivalent presence of the arm” (430-431). There is no deliberate decision made by the patient to deny existence or assert existence (depending on the case), but it comes from something deeper. Ponty says that it finds its genesis elsewhere, not in the patient declaring: “I think that…”, but it needs-to-be for the patient.

This idea hinges on the aforementioned projective outlook of the living-body toward the world. The living-body views the world in terms of projects it wishes to accomplish, and to do this the body becomes unperceived as it learns to perform certain skills. The body, in this sense, is comprised of two layers: the habitual and the present. The habitual is that which we have learned to do and can do without thinking (turning a doorknob or tying a shoe). These skills are put at the disposal of the present body, and because one does not have to think about them, to bring them into the present body, they do not intrude upon the present body. When, as a young child, one learns to turn a doorknob, this becomes part of the habitual body and can be utilized by the present body.

The problem approaches when something interrupts this transmission from habitual body to present body, i.e. a disfigurement or a handicap. In this case, an amputated arm for example, the present body can no longer rely on the habitual. The tying-of-the-shoes becomes impossible, as well as the opening-of-the-door. This causes great pain for the patient and may result in the phenomenon of phantom limb or anosognosia, as a way for the patient to continue it his or her existence. The patient never really deals with the situation, but covers it up somewhat; thus the analogy to psychoanalytic repression.

So here we can come to understand that a merely physical or psychological explanation of the phenomenon of phantom limbs or anosognosia are lacking. The patient must be viewed as occupying a middle ground between the two. He builds a self through his past and relies on it in the present and in toward a future horizon. When this reliance is disturbed through a handicap, the patient must act (or not act) in someway so that he may continue in his existence. Often this results in a repression of the malady so that the patient believes he will continue on his same path, relying on his past and directing his living-body toward the future.

Citations

Mooney, Timothy & Moran Dermot, eds. The Phenomenology Reader. Routledge Publishing, London and New York. 2004. (Reprint of The Body as Object and Mechanistic Pysiology)

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After interpretation, these scores are used to classify subjects as either:

1. Alpha: External, Norm Favoring
2. Beta: Internal, Norm Favoring
3. Gamma: External, Norm Doubting
4. Delta: Internal, Norm Doubting

The scales were developed from an initial normative sample consisting of six thousand men and seven thousand women, which while not constructed through random selection, nonetheless captured a comprehensive cross-section of society. The reliability of the CPI has been assessed as to its internal consistency, as judged by alpha (.77 median) and test-retest (medians: 1 year=. 68, 5 year=.56, 25 year .58). The CPI has been shown to have predictive power in regard both to an individual’s behavior as well as subjective judgments of him made by others. Because of its relative thrift, brevity, and effectiveness, the CPI is widely used in business and governmental organizations.

The California Psychological Inventory, also referred to as the CPI-434, was originally published in 1957, and the version currently in use is the third edition. The latest revision of the California Psychological Inventory was in 1996 (Saladin, p.2). In 2002, a new version of the California Psychological Inventory was published, the CPI-260, which is a shorter version of the original California Psychological Inventory test.

The author of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI-434 and CPI-260) is Harrison G. Gough, PhD, and the publisher is Consulting Psychologists Press, in Palo Alto, California. The average cost of the basic administration materials, including a manual, item booklet, Interpretation guide and a packet of answer sheets is $462, and can be purchased through the publishing company (http://www.cpp.com).

The California Psychological Inventory was designed as a non-clinical Personality Inventory (Saladin, p.2). The test is a 434-item instrument in true-false format, and the design format is similar to the MMPI. It can be scored either by hand or computer (http://www.cpp.com).

The California Psychological Inventory was originally designed for group administration; however, it can also be administered individually (Megargee, p.5). The test is untimed, and the average length of time for administration is 45-60 minutes.

To administer the California Psychological Inventory, an examiner must have a Level C Qualification. To obtain this level of qualification, the examiner must have satisfactorily completed a course in the interpretation of Psychological tests at an accredited college or university, and possess an advanced degree in a profession that provides specialized training in the interpretation of psychological assessments (http://www.cpp.com).

The intended population of the California Psychological Inventory is normal individuals aged 12 and older, however the content is geared primarily toward students and young adults (Megargee, p.5). The test requires a fourth-grade reading level, unless the items are read aloud to the respondents (Megargee, p.5).

The purpose of the California Psychological Inventory is to measure and evaluate interpersonal behavior and social interaction within normal individuals. Harrison Gough defined the purpose of the test’s sales “to forecast what a person will say and do under defined conditions, and to identify individuals who will be described in characteristic ways by others who know them well or who observe their behavior in particular contexts.” (http://www.cpp.com)

The items on the California Psychological Inventory produce scores for the following 20 folk scales: Capacity for Status, Sociability, Social Presence, Self-Acceptance, Sense of Well Being, Responsibility, Socialization, Self-Control, Tolerance, Good Impression, Communality, Achievement via Conformance, Achievement via Independence, Intellectual Efficiency, Psychological Mindedness, Femininity/Masculinity Independence, Flexibility and Empathy (http://www.cpp.com).

The twenty scales are divided into four classes, including measures of poise, self-assurance and inter-personal proclivities; measures of normative orientation and values; measures of cognitive and intellectual functioning; and measures of Role and Personal Style (http://www.cpp.com).

For scoring the California Psychological Inventory, the raw scores for each scale are transferred to a profile sheet. By plotting the scores on a profile sheet, they are converted to T-scores: standard scores with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10 (Megargee, p.5).

The scores are interpreted and documented into three different reports, the Profile, Narrative, and Configurable Analysis. The interpreted scores identify an individual as being one of four types: an Alpha-External, Norm Favoring; Beta-Internal, Norm Favoring; Gamma-External, Norm Doubting; or a Delta-Internal, Norm Doubting (Saladin, p.25-28).

The description of an Alpha-External, Norm Favoring includes personality characteristics including forceful, dominant, ambitious, assertive, extroverted and action oriented (Saladin, p.25). The personality characteristics of a Beta-Internal, Norm Favoring include low keyed, nurturant, responsible, stable, dependable and predictable (Saladin, p.26). For Gamma-External, Norm Doubting, characteristics include innovative, clever, adventurous, and questioning of the status quo (Saladin, p.27). The common personality characteristics of a Delta-Internal, Norm Doubting include reflective, detached, preoccupied and perceptive (Saladin, p.28).

In developing the California Psychological Inventory, Harrison Gough avoided using a theory based inventory, and instead, opted to use the approach of examining the setting in which the test is to be used and developing measurements based on the constructs already in operational usage there (Megargee, p.12). In this way, Gough proposed, the scales have general direct relevance because they are dealing with concepts which have already attained a degree of functional validity (Megargee, p.12). He referred to the 20 scales of the California Psychological Inventory as “folk scales”. For the actual method of test and item construction, Gough used the External Criterion method for deriving the majority of the scales, and the rational procedures of Internal Consistency Analysis for the remainder (Megargee, p.25).

In development of the California Psychological Inventory, a normative sample was used that consisted of six thousand men and seven thousand women (Megargee, p. 6). The sample cannot be considered a true random or stratified sample for various reasons; however, the sample did include subjects of widely varying age, socioeconomic status, and geographical areas (Megargee, p. 6).

The procedures used in assessing the reliability of the California Psychological Inventory were internal consistency with alpha and test-retest. The Alpha reliabilities for the 20 folk scales ranged from .62 to .84, with .77 being the median (Saladin, p.3).

The test-retest reliabilities of the 20 folk scales were assessed for 1 year, 5 years, and 25 years after the initial assessment. For the 1 year test-retest assessment, the reliability at the High School level ranged from .51 to .84, with .68 as the median. For the 5 year test-retest assessment, the reliability at the adult level ranged from .36 to .73, with .56 as the median. For the 25 year test-retest assessment, the reliability at the adult level ranged from .37 to .82, with .58 being the median (Saladin, p.3).

Reliability was also assessed for 3 Vector scales, using internal consistency with alpha and test-retest. The Alpha median was .82, and .59-.77 was the range for test-retest (Saladin, p.3).

In assessing the validity of the California Psychological Inventory scales, Gough used two basic criteria. The first was that the scales must identify people who will behave in a specified way. Secondly, people with high scores must impress others as having the quality in question (Megargee, p.27). Additionally, Gough subjected the scales to a conceptual analysis to clarify what it is that each scale was assessing as well as exploring them for unexpected relationships and uses (Megargee, p.27). These analyses included formal validation studies. An acceptable amount of research on the converegent validity of the California Psychological Inventory has also been done. Correlations between individual CPI scales and relevant external criteria fall in the .2 to .5 range, which are typical for personality research (http://www.cpp.com). Information on item correlations and factorial analyses is unavailable.

Marketing for the California Psychological Inventory has been primarily aimed at business leaders, for use in finding and developing successful employees, identifying and developing leaders and creating efficient organizations. However, the CPI is used for measurement in a variety of settings. It is often used in schools and colleges for academic counseling, identifying leaders and predicting success; in clinics and counseling agencies for evaluating substance abuse, susceptibility to physical illness, marital discord, juvenile delinquency and criminality, and social immaturity; and for cross cultural and other research (http://www.cpp.com).

A range of informative studies have been done utilizing the California Psychological Inventory. In 1998, a study was published titled “Prediction of Dysfunctional Job Behaviors Among Law Enforcement Officers” (Sarchione, Cuttler, Muchinsky and Nelson-Gray,1998), and used three of the CPI scales – Responsibility, Socialization, and Self-Control. The study concluded that while the CPI was accurate and useful in assessing the construct of conscientiousness, it was not as accurate in hypothesizing construct-oriented life history indices (drug use, criminal, and work) (Sarchione, et al.,1998).

In 1996, a study was published titled “Psychometric Properties of the California Psychological Inventory Socialization Scale in Treatment-Seeking Alcoholics” (Kadden, Donovan, Litt and Cooney,1996). The study examined the psychometric properties of the CPI’s Socialization scale (So, used to assess sociopathy) with regard to alcoholics. The participants were 1,627 alcoholics taking part in a national trial of patient-treatment matching, and found that the distribution of CPI-So scores was consistent with that of other studies of alcoholics, and the findings support the reliability and validity of the scale with that population (Kadden, et al.,1996).

There are a number of general strengths in the California Psychological Inventory. These include its proven ability in predictive studies, and generally, people usually find that their personal descriptions match those that the scales suggest. An additional strength and one that is reported more so in the CPI-260, is that it is difficult for an individual to fake bad or fake good. The California Psychological Inventory is also praised for its versatility (Laufer,Skoog and Day (1982).

The California Psychological Inventory also has weakness. As mentioned, the normative group used in the test design be considered a true random or stratified sample. One reason is that racially, Caucasians are highly overrepresented in the sample (Megargee, p.6). In “Personality and Criminality: A Review of the California Psychological Inventory” (Laufer,et al.,1982), the authors point out that while research has been performed using various minority ethnic groups, the results are disquieting as they show that lower class, minority group members tend to obtain lower scores on almost all 20 CPI scales (Laufer, et al., 1982).. In order for this to be corrected, researchers are encouraged to consider the effect that certain variables (race, SES, IQ, etc) have on CPI scores (Laufer, et al., 1982). This weakness with the California Psychological Inventory is especially important in regard to the validity of predictive studies in prison populations, with parolees, etc.

An additional weakness with the California Psychological Inventory is the information available on its validity. While an adequate amount of information is available in regards to its reliability, with so little information available, it is difficult for one to determine the adequacy of the test’s validity.

Despite the bias within its initial normative sample and inability to compensate for socioeconomic status, the CPI has proven itself as a valuable predictor of both an individual’s future behavior and the peer’s assessments of the given individual. With relative parsimony and thrift, the CPI further provides a valuable analysis of individual personality, and avails those results in terms comprehensible to laypeople. The enduring applicability of the CPI has evinced itself in numerous recent studies that have successfully used the CPI in such wide-ranging applications as: the behavior of alcoholics, prediction of leadership capacity, and potential for law-enforcement effectiveness. The comprehensiveness and generally sound theoretical underpinnings of the CPI suggest high chances of its continued applicability.

References

Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. Retrieved April 20, 2005 from
http://www.cpp.com

Kadden, Donovan, Litt and Cooney (1996). Psychometric Properties of the California Psychological Inventory Socialization Scale in Treatment-Seeking Alcoholics. Psychology of Addictive Behavior, Vol.10, 3, 131-146

Laufer, Skoog, and Day (1982). Personality and Criminality: a Review of the California Psychological Inventory, Journal of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 38, 3, 562-72

Megargee, Edwin I. (1972). The California Psychological Inventory Handbook. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc. Publishers. PP 2,5-6,12,25-27

Saladin, Steve. California Psychological Inventory Revised http://www.webs.uidaho.edu/saladin/510/CPI.pdf

Sarchione, Cuttler, Muchinsky and Nelson-Gray(1998). Prediction of Dysfunctional Job Behaviors Among Law Enforcement Officers. Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 83, 6, 904-912

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