The Illinois voter registration policy requires all Illinois citizens who wish to vote in local, state, and federal elections to register as voters in their respective counties. The registration process must be completed at least twenty-seven days before the election in which the potential voter wishes to participate. In order to qualify as a registered voter, one must meet the following criteria: 1) must be a U.S. citizen, 2) must be at least eighteen years of age on or before election day, and 3) must have been a resident of the precinct for at least thirty days prior to the election (CBEC, 2004). Those wishing to register may do so at a number of locations, some of which include the County Clerk’s office, any township office, some schools, at the Department of Motor Vehicles, public aid offices, and health department offices (CBEC, 2004). At the time of registration, each individual must present two current forms of identification, one of which must bear the person’s current address. If a person chooses to register by mail, that person must vote in person for the first time, unless he/she is disabled or serving in the military. After registration is completed, and the voter receives his/her registration card in the mail, the voter becomes a permanent, registered Illinois voter, unless he/she moves to a new address or changes his/her name (CBEC, 2004).

Some confusing stipulations during this process occasionally prevent legitimate voter registration, which ultimately leaves a number of people unregistered, and thus unable to cast a vote in a given election (Hayduk, 2004). For instance, a person who changes residence within twenty-seven days prior to an election, and within the same voting precinct, is allowed to vote on a full ballot only is he/she signs an affidavit swearing his/her identity, address, and registration are valid (SBE, 2004). Similarly, if a person moves within the same precinct more than thirty days prior to an election and has failed to transfer registration, he/she is allowed to vote only for candidates competing for federal office, upon completing a change-of-address document (SBE, 2004). However, if a person moves more than thirty days before an election, “has moved out of the previous municipality under the board of election commissioners,” and failed to transfer registration, he/she is not allowed to vote (SBE, 2004). Any abuse of the registration process is considered a Class 4 felony, subjecting perpetrators of a fine of $25,000, as well as the threat of one to three years in a state penitentiary (Sanford, 2000).

By preventing people from voting, the Illinois voter registration policy inadvertently skews the voting pool (PFAWF, 2004). Voter discrepancy, the inconsistency between a voting population’s representation of its state in an election and the actual majority political inclination of that population, can create devastatingly inaccurate representation of that state in an election (Freeman, 2004). For instance, Chicago is known for its overwhelmingly Democratic political tendency. The city is partisan to the degree that it has developed a reputation for repressing or otherwise nullifying Republican votes (Grimshaw, 1992). Chicago’s dense population of nearly 2,900,000 comprises a significant portion of Illinois’ total population of 12,500,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). If a large number of Democratic Chicago votes were invalidated due to residency issues, registration failure, etc., it is possible that the Illinois electoral votes could count toward the Republican candidate (Sterling, 1981). Most of Chicago (and thereby, a significant portion of Illinois) would still strongly favor the Democratic candidate, and would lose their voices to the flawed system. A Republican leaning would be incorrectly attributed to Illinois overall, and in a close election (such as those of 2000 and 2004), this could dramatically affect the outcome of the race (Sterling, 1981).

There are many populations who are at risk of having their voices stifled through invalid voter registration (NCH, 2004). For instance, homeless individuals, with no permanent address, may face obstacles when attempting to register. If the registration is completed, they have no mailing address at which to receive their registration cards, and likely no identification with an accurate, current street address. A similar situation faces transient, displaced, and certain other severely marginalized individuals; therefore a lack of a stable, permanent home address makes it impossible for an individual to register to vote (NCH, 2004). In many cases, non-homeless, non-transient, and non-displaced individuals simply forget to register before the deadline (SBE, 2004). Consequently, they cannot vote, and they, combined with others unable to register for various reasons, will not be represented in the election. This situation could ultimately lead to a misrepresentation of state opinion, as well as present ample opportunity for voter fraud (PFAWF, 2004). Voter fraud is the direct, intentional misrepresentation of a voting population achieved through intimidation, refusal of, or attempts to discourage from voting certain voters or potential voters who may pose a threat to a specific political party or interest, or the act of physically interfering with or removing these ballots in an act called “ballot tampering” (Grimshaw, 1992). Another form of voter fraud is the submission of multiple votes, which is achieved by submitting inaccurate registration information in an invalid voting precinct, often in addition to valid registration in one’s own precinct (Harris, 2004). As previously mentioned, voter fraud is a Class 4 felony, punishable by one to three years in a state penitentiary and/or up to a $25,000 fine (Sanford, 2000).

In recent elections, Illinois voter registration policy, and others similar to it, have come into question because of the inherent bias in the system (PFAWF, 2004). Homeless and other marginalized individuals are often excluded from voter eligibility due to their lack of stable residence, or proof of identity/address (NCH, 2004). Similarly, homeless, transient, and other individuals facing registration difficulties are most often members of a racial minority group, commonly African-American (Grimshaw, 1992). The Illinois voter registration system does not simply make it difficult for those of low socioeconomic status to register, but also silences thousands of Illinois residents whose lives are affected by decisions made in the voting process (Grimshaw, 1992). This situation is reminiscent of the poll taxes and literacy exams of the post-Civil War era, in which anyone wishing to vote was subject to either a tax or a test proving literacy. Both of these restrictions were disadvantageous to African-Americans and of the time, as they had only recently been released from slavery, were poor, and had received limited or no education (Barton, 2003). Although less direct and more subtle than the poll taxes and literacy exams of the 1800s, the Illinois voter registration system creates a parallel atmosphere of frustration and restriction for those of lower socioeconomic status, and therefore, for many African-Americans and other racial minorities. By repressing these populations’ votes, the system creates a continual probability that the middle and upper-classes maintain control of Illinois politics (Grinshaw, 1992).

In striking contrast to the Illinois system, Wisconsin voter registration policy offers significantly more opportunity for interested citizens to register as voters (SEB, 2004). In order to register to vote in Wisconsin, one must meet the following conditions: 1) must be a U.S. citizen, 2) must be a resident of Wisconsin, and 3) must be at least eighteen years of age on or before election day (Haas, 1996). To prove citizenship of Wisconsin, voters are required to furnish a driver’s license or state I.D., or provide the last four digits of his/her social security number (SEB, 2004). The potential voter in Wisconsin has three options for completing the registration process. The first is registration by mail, which requires the resident to complete and mail the registration form to the county clerk’s office by 5:00 PM on the 13th day before the election (as compared to the 27th day in Illinois). For a first-time registration applicant, identification must be included with this application. Acceptable forms of identification include a driver’s license, state I.D., other photo I.D., or any piece of mail or government document indicating the voter’s name and current address (SEB, 2004). The second registration option is to register in person at the County Clerk’s office, which may be done up until 5:00 PM on the day before the election. After the “by mail” deadline, potential voters must present identification with the following characteristics: bears the voter’s name, including given and family name, and bears the voter’s residential address, including street number and municipality. Also required is a utility bill or other proof of living at the current address for at least ten days prior to the election, as opposed to the strict 30-day requirement in Illinois (SEB, 2004).

Clearly, Wisconsin voter registration policy offers more ample opportunity for voter turnout. Because of the fact that the only strict requirements for registration in Wisconsin are proof of age and proof of 10-day residency, there is a degree of flexibility allowing for a broad scope of populations to register (SEB, 2004). Transients, the homeless, or other persons in shelters can use a shelter address as a place of residence, because the time frame is so much shorter than in Illinois. An example of homeless persons being empowered to vote in Wisconsin is the Hope House of Milwaukee (NCH, 2004). This organization, a shelter for homeless families, developed an innovative program to utilize community resources in an effort to make voting more accessible to the shelter’s residents. Prior to the 2000 election, the Hope House staff gathered information and research about the candidates; in addition, they wrote a letter to each candidate requesting a brief reply explaining his stance on major issues relevant to residents (NCH, 2004). The candidates complied with this request, and shelter residents began forming informed opinions on the issues. Also, the staff arranged for the City Elections Committee to set up a voter registration site on the shelter premises, to counteract transportation problems (NCH, 2004). Before election day, the City Elections Committee traveled to Hope House and employed a mock voting session, to ease the residents’ anxieties and familiarize them with the voting process. The staff also created a document, to be completed by residents, declaring residency at the shelter. For families that had recently transitioned out of the shelter, the staff offered maps illustrating election districts and directed the ex-residents to their respective polling places (NCH, 2004).

Although Wisconsin voter registration policy offers more opportunity for residents to register and vote, it also arguably offers more opportunity for voter fraud. Challengers of the Wisconsin system maintain that such lenient registration guidelines offer more loopholes than states with stricter statutes (Bennett, 1990).For instance, critics argue, people can easily claim residency at any address for which they receive utility bills, and may inadvertently be allowed to vote in multiple precincts (Harris, 2004).While this assertion is theoretically sound, the voting system offers stringent control for such oversights (Haas, 1996).In 2003, Mark Grebner, Co-Owner of Wisconsin Voter Lists, gave a speech before the Senate Committee on Education, Ethics, and Elections. Grebner stated, “My firm, which does business here at Wisconsin Voter Lists, has built a complete and accurate voter database for Wisconsin. Our file includes names, addresses, dates-of-birth, phone numbers, political jurisdictions, and voter history from 1996 to the present for over 4 million eligible voters” (Grebner, 2003). Access to this database can readily identify multiple names, addresses, and duplicate or falsified Social Security numbers, as well as names of deceased or non-eligible individuals (Grebner, 2003). Despite any criticism of Wisconsin’s voter registration system, it is clear that the combination of ample security controls, coupled with its flexibility, make this policy more accommodating to a greater population than do many other states (Grebner, 2003).

Several organizations in the past have recognized and responded to Illinois’ current mandatory voter registration policy. For instance, the Rainbow Coalition and Operation PUSH have helped launch the Illinois Freedom Bus Tour (RPC, 2004). This “tour” is actually a chain of buses and other vehicles that traverse the entire state of Illinois each day for a month preceding an election, transporting unregistered voters to registration sites (RPC, 2004). The Rainbow Coalition, founded in 1971, and Operation PUSH merged to become the Rainbow/PUSH Coalition (RPC), overseen by Reverend Jesse L. Jackson, Sr. (RPC, 2004). On a smaller scale, certain colleges, universities, and other organizations offer transportation to and from registration and election sites (NAICU, 2004). Hope Haven, a DeKalb, IL emergency/transitional shelter similar to Milwaukee’s Hope House, offers rides to polling places, declaration of residency at the shelter, and informative political literature to shelter residents.* Interestingly, much of Illinois’ efforts in counteracting voter inequality have been focused on alleviating social repercussions of current policy, rather than reforming the policy itself. It is this author’s opinion that lobbying for policy reform is the next logical step toward empowering marginalized populations to vote, in order to effectively service the largest population possible.

The Illinois voter registration system became strict policy in 1995, with the implementation of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) by President Clinton in 1993 (Jackson, 1996). The NVRA is commonly known as the “Motor Voter Law” (Cain, 1996) becauseit calls for unregistered or relocated voters to register/re-register when applying for or renewing their drivers’ licenses. The NVRA goes beyond the scope of registration opportunity at the DMV. It allows for non-partisan registration in numerous settings, some of which include libraries, schools, churches, military recruiting centers, and social service agencies (Jackson, 1996).Individual state law dictates how each state handles voter registration. Illinois’ rigorous requirements were initially met with strong resistance, namely by Governor Jim Edgar, whose opposition decelerated implementation of NVRA (Jackson, 1996). Edgar’s stance was faced with criticism of its own, cynically attributed by some to the “Chicago Democratic Machine” at work (Grimshaw, 1992).Some conservative Illinoisans denounced criticism of Edgar’s reluctance to accept NVRA, implying that NVRA was essentially a liberal ploy to slant the vote to the left, by empowering populations (minorities, the poor) who would likely be inclined to vote Democratic (Grimshaw, 1992). A stated goal of the NVRA is to register and empower disenfranchised people. Reverend Jackson states, “The poor, the less educated, the young, and people of color register and vote at a much lower percentage. The purpose of the law and its design was to register these most disenfranchised people” (Jackson, 1996, p. 30). Ironically, registration requirements appear to hinder those individuals they intend to aid, as several categories of “disenfranchised individuals” lack the required materials for voter registration.

History offers conflicting views on effective and ineffective approaches to voter registration policy. Since the beginning of formal elections there has been voter fraud, and there has been at least moderately discriminatory policy design (Barusch, 2002). Likewise, there will always be contradicting views on how to deal with these problems. However, upon analyzing current Illinois voter registration policy, the necessity of reform becomes clear. Eligible voters are being turned away at the polls because of loopholes and flaws in the system. This puts the state at risk for gross misrepresentation in the polls, which contradicts the inherent purpose of voting policy. By switching to a polling system more conducive to the needs of all populations within the state, Illinois would more accurately convey the opinions of its citizen. The recent 2004 election, with its publicly-decried surge of fraud and polling mishaps (Freeman, 2004), serves as a frank reminder to Americans that despite promises of democracy, a corrupt system can always manipulate its preferences into policy. However, it is the duty of the government to provide beneficial, accommodating policies to citizens, and Illinois voter registration policy has much room for improvement.

The acute awareness of voter fraud and other faults of Illinois voting policy is a relatively recent development (Grimshaw, 1992). Sketchy historical research is available on the correlation between registration policies and instances of fraud or other mishaps. Recent history serves to educate the public on what sorts of consequences follow unsatisfactory policy (Freeman, 2004). The 2000 and 2004 elections provide significant education regarding both Illinois and national voter registration policies and their consequences (PFAWF, 2004). The registration system itself, the foundation of modern American elections, also proves itself the backbone of voter fraud development (Harris, 2004). In states with strict registration regulations, such as Illinois, fraud evolves as a response to the relative ease with which restrictions can be imposed upon politically-undesirable populations (Hayduk, 2004). For instance, in a heavily Republican area, poll judges and other officials may be biased in favor of a Republican candidate. Thus, they may attempt to discourage or void the vote of a voter belonging to a Democratic-leaning demographic, perhaps nullifying the vote based on a technicality forgiven for voters appearing more Republican-friendly (Grimshaw, 1992).

Efforts to resolve the problem of voter discrepancy are certainly in accordance with research findings (Bennett, 1990). Young, first-time voters are being informed of their “duty” to register. Organizations broadcast their respective messages about voting and registration and civic duties for months preceding elections. In spite of these public urges to vote, many individuals of low socioeconomic status remain most discouraged from the polls, due to lack of resources and information (Hayduk, 2004). These oppressed populations comprise a significant component of society, and their votes alone would be sufficient to offset many previously-elected officials (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). With higher numbers of impoverished, homeless, transient, invalid, or otherwise disenfranchised groups concentrated in large cities (such as Chicago), it is outrageous for such populations to be virtually ignored in elections in which officials often speak to topics and policies relevant to the oppressed. The people who most rely on officials for social survival are constantly edged out of important electoral processes, simply because they lack something as considerable as a home address or proof of long-term residence.

Through examination of the aforementioned Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, similar smaller-scale groups, and policy reform issues, it is evident that oppressed populations are moving into central focus as being underserved in the political arena (PFAWF, 2004). Significantly more attention must be directed toward reforming laws and enabling such populations to register and vote, lest the system defeat its own purpose.

A major goal of the Illinois voter registration system is to allow every eligible citizen the opportunity to vote in a fair election through a non-biased, non-partisan polling process (Jackson, 1996). This manifest purpose is eloquently described by Reverend Jesse Jackson, Sr.:

“[The law] allows non-partisan voter registration to take place in a wide variety of ways and settings…Who you vote for, Republican, Democrat, or Independent, is your own private business. That we as a society go out of our way to make sure that all eligible people are registered to vote should be the business of the public and public officials who are charged with the responsibility of implementing the law.” Jackson continues, criticizing Illinois officials: “In this instance, those officials are failing in their public trust” (Jackson, 1996, p. 30).

An underlying, unspoken goal of democracy permeates the topic of voting policy in Illinois. There is a general consensus of residents regarding the goals of policy. People want their votes to count; otherwise, they would fail to register, appear at the polls, or profess concern over disparity in policy. However, simply adopting agreement regarding goals is a far cry from approving a given policy. An implicit assumption of the Illinois voter registration system is that it will yield fair, non-partisan assurance that each vote will count toward accurate state representation (SBE, 2004). This hypothesis fails to account for human nature. Good intentions of policy makers cannot undo the corruption of others. On the contrary, inherent defects in the system “accidentally” invalidate the votes of thousands of disenfranchised populations in each election (PFAWF, 2004). Good intentions aside, it is impossible for policy hypotheses to control for human greed.

Theoretically, Illinois voter registration policy successfully accomplishes its goals of providing a fair, non-partisan registration and vote to registered voters. For those who remember to register, and those who are fortunate enough to meet the strict registration criteria, this process appears accommodating and seamless. But for those populations lacking homes, identification, transportation, physical capacity, or other resources, the Illinois registration system has failed. By modifying this policy to include accommodations and allowances for disadvantaged populations, the Illinois state government could offer its residents an opportunity to achieve the satisfaction of having their voices heard, their citizenship acknowledged, and their votes counted.

References

Barton, D. (2003). Black History Issue: 2003. Wallbuilders: Search issues, articles, and newsletters. Retreived Dec. 4, 2004 from http://www.wallbuilders.com/resources/search/detail.php?ResourceID=95.

Barusch, A.S. (2002). Foundations of social policy: Social justice, public programs, and the social work profession. Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc.

Bennett, S.E. (1990). The uses and abuses of registration and turnout data: Ananalysis of Piven and Cloward’s studies of nonvoting in America.PS: Political Science and Politics, 23(2), 166-171.

Cain, B. (1996). On the road with motor voter. Update on Law-Related Education, 20, 15-16.

Chicago Board of Election Commissioners (CBEC) (2004). Judge of Election Handbook 2004. Chicago: Board of Election Commissioners.

Freeman, S. (2004). The unexplained exit poll discrepancy. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, Penn School of Arts & Sciences, Center for Organizational Dynamics.

Grebner, M. (2003). Wisconsin voter lists. Testimony on 2003 on AN 600 & AB 601, relating to HAVA. Retrieved Dec. 7, 2004 from: http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/strat.html.

Grimshaw, W.J. (1992). Bitter fruit: Black politics and the Chicago machine, 1931-1991. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Haas, S.P. (1996). Overview of the election process in Wisconsin (staff brief). Madison, WI: Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff.

Harris, B. (2004). Black box voting: Ballot tampering in the 21st century. Renton, WA: Talion Publishing.

Hayduk, R. (2004). Democracy for all: Restoring immigrant voting rights in the U.S. New Political Science, 26(4), 499-523.

Illinois State Board of Elections (SBE). (2004). Voting information: registering to vote in Illinois. Retrieved Nov. 29, 2004 from: http://www.elections.state.il.us/VotingInformation/Register.htm.

Jackson, J.L. “Implement the National Voter Registration Act.” (1996, April 15). The Chicago Sun Times, 30.

National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU). (2004).

National campus voter registration project: Examples of campus voter registration, education, and get-out-the-vote activities.

National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH). Model Wisconsin program excels at voter registration. Retrieved Nov. 28, 2004 from: www.nationalhomeless.org/vote/wisconsin.html.

People for the American Way Foundation (PFAWF). (2004). Election protection:

Protecting voters’ rights in 2004 and beyond. Retrieved Nov. 28, 2004 from: http://www.electionprotection2004.org/coalition.htm.

Rainbow/Push Coalition (RPC). (2004). History of RPC. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2004 from: http://www.rainbowpush.org/about/.

Sanford, W.H. (2000). State of Illinois crime and punishment chart: Year 2000. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2004 from The National Crime and Punishment Learning Center: http://www.crimeandpunishment.net/IL.

Sterling, C.W. (1981). Electoral college misrepresentation: A geometric analysis. Polity, 13(3), 425-449.

United States Census Bureau (2004). Population finder. Retrived Nov. 28, 2004 from: http://www.census.gov/.

Wisconsin State Elections Board (SEB). (2004). How to register to vote. Retrieved Nov.

29, 2004 from: http://elections.state.wi.us/faq_detail.asp?faqid=119&fid=27.

* This author spent one year as a case manager at Hope Haven, and assisted with providing election information to residents. Information in this paper referencing Hope Haven is drawn from this author’s direct experience in the shelter.

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Opponents of the legal recognition of same-gender marriage often cite legislative and historical reasons for their positions. Yet it is within the backgrounds of their same resources that one can find cause to ensure that gay couples receive the legal protections, rights, and privileges as do our hetero-gendered counterparts.

Legislative Context

Article IV, Sections 1 and 2, of the United States Constitution is very clear with regard to the legal responsibilities shared between and among all the states in the Union. Known as “Full Faith and Credit”, the sections of this Article state that “[full] faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state” and that “[the] citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges… of citizens in the several states”¹. Several questions arise to test the hypothesis that marriages between gay persons are legislatively the same as marriages between non-gay persons.

1. Can marriages between gay persons be considered public acts? Yes, they can, in the same ways that marriages between non-gay persons are considered public acts. Marriages between gay persons, which are often referred to as Holy Unions, involve in vows spoken before clergy, friends, and families, in ceremonies as similar and diverse as marriages between non-gay persons. Holy Unions also include the exchanging of rings, charges to the couple as well as to their witnesses, celebrations of Holy Communion, and many other aspects of the marriage rite. In fact, the celebration of the union between two gay persons constitutes a traditional marriage ceremony, in every way but one: the genders of the persons taking the vows.
2. Are marriages between gay persons matters of public record? Whenever possible, yes they are. In states where affianced gay couples are allowed to apply for marriage certificates and submit other paperwork to secure legal standing for their relationships, they do so. When they meet opposition or resistance to their registries, they often attempt to fight that discrimination through legal means. These actions, as well as their ramifications, become public record through court filings, news coverage, and other forms of public record keeping.
3. Do any aspects of marriage between gay persons become judicial proceedings? Yes, they do. Fighting marriage discrimination through court filings is just one way this occurs. When one partner takes the last name of the other, and makes this change through the court system, this process is a legal proceeding. The adoption of children within the union is a legal proceeding, as are any adoptions occurring during the course of the relationship. Whatever legal actions gay couples take to establish the existence and validity of their relationships and their families are judicial proceedings.

In the test of legality, marriages involving gay couples pass the legislative test. It would, therefore, show an undeniably high level of bigotry for opponents of gay marriage to enact laws that so obviously counter the spirit of equality expressed in the “Full Faith and Credit” Article contained in the US Constitution.

Historical Context

The United States has a long history of oppression, segregation, and discriminatory practices—all legal during various times in our struggle to become, and remain, a united collection of states and territories. In fact, much the United States (particularly, the South) was built through the blood, sweat, and laborious tears of a people who legally “belonged” to others who brought them here by force. Those who have been charged with running our government began that legacy by enforcing “squatters’ rights”, also known as adverse possession. The “squatters”, in this case, came to this country and—through brutal and bloody means—claimed these lands for their own, uprooting and displacing thousands of native peoples who had lived here for generations before them. Walking through the doorway of this new millennium, it is really no wonder that there are still those who hang on to rights, protections, and privileges as if no one else deserves the same considerations.

Fifty years ago, the push for civil rights brought the realities and ramifications of institutionalized and legalized discrimination into the forefront of the American consciousness. African Americans—Americans whose ancestors were forcibly removed from their homelands, brought to this strange place, and worked until death without pay—stood up to say that “separate but equal” is never equal and never works. Fast forward to 2005, and we find that the same belief holds true for gay couples seeking marriage equality.

The Rainbow Alliance cites over sixty areas that are unequal in their applications to gay and non-gay couples, among them:

1. Shared Taxes. Married non-gay couples get to average their salaries to reach a lower bracket which benefits married couples with one high-wage worker and one low-wage worker (typical of a family where perhaps the mother works “mom’s hours” to supplement the budget while the kids are young.) Gay couples in a comparable situation are taxed at a higher rate.
2. Next-of-kin privileges. If one partner gets sick or dies, the other can be shut out of the process by the patient’s family, particularly dangerous in families who do not accept the patient’s partner or family situation. Legal recognition of marriages between gay persons would place the control of these gut wrenching situations into the control of the spouse and not the patient’s family-of-birth, just as it is in marriages between non-gay persons.
3. Bereavement leave. Many employers only grant leave to workers who lose close relatives. Significant Others (SOs) are not factored into the equation, so to speak, unlike spouses in legally recognized marriages.
4. Pensions and health insurance. Few employers grant benefits to the spouses of their gay employees. Even in those cases where benefits are granted, these benefits are taxed; spousal benefits for non-gay beneficiaries are not taxed.
5. Immigration. Marriage between immigrants and non-gay Americans automatically confers US citizenship to immigrating spouses. Gay couples have to separate when the immigrating spouse’s visa expires.
6. Social Security. Only the surviving spouses in non-gay marriages receive survivor benefits.
7. Inheritance. Gay spouses pay estate taxes, non-gay spouses are exempt. In addition, only non-gay widows and widowers have legal standing to challenge the wills of their late spouses.²

These examples serve to illustrate, with depth and clarity, the breadth of subjugation practices in the United States with legislative and historical precedence and prescience. These practices are systematic, ingrained in our psyches for the past 500 years. It is how we have been operating; it is still the way we operate today. Gay couples in the United States face the same struggle for marriage equality that Native American couples, American couples of African Descent, and American Black/White couples faced over the course of uniting these states—making the theory of “special rights”³ a moot point. Legal marriage protection, with the bestowal of legal marital responsibilities and legal marital privileges, is not a special right. It is a cultural trinity that represents a sacred rite of passage, one that should available to every law abiding (or what passes for such), tax paying, and contributing citizen of the United States and her possessions. It was once withheld from native couples, from black couples, and from black-and-white couples, during the course of our history together, and laws are being enacted and re-interpreted in order to withhold it from non-gay couples. But if we all pay the same taxes and abide by the same laws, those laws need to include and protect all of us and confer upon us the same rights, privileges, and responsibilities, regardless of the genders of our spouses.

Whether approaching the issue of gay marriage from a legislative standpoint or from a historical one, it is clear that the present course of events will lead to a definite change in the fabric of how one defines what it means to be an American. Our cultural history indicates that gay couples are just another segment of society whose once-ignored face is gaining clarity and shape on the American landscape. How will future generations see us? Today’s high-school and college-age kids are tomorrow’s government and cultural leaders—and many of them have gay parents, uncles and aunts, and grandparents. And many of them are gay, as well. It is my hope that the laws we enact now will protect them and endow all of them with the same rights and privileges, regardless of the genders of their spouses.

Cited

1 US House of Representatives – Text of the U.S. Constitution.

2 The Rainbow Alliance – Religious Definition of Marriage.

3 Note: ‘Special rights’ is a political term used primarily by conservatives in the United States to refer to laws that enumerate rights related to sexual orientation. Gay rights advocates prefer to describe these laws as ending discrimination, and thus conferring equal rights.” Wikipedia – Special rights.

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With no real direction and already in her fifth year at the school, she decided to drop out and took a working-class job as a clerk at a corporate-owned grocery store in the area. While Judi had been somewhat of a peace activist in college, her leadership qualities as an activist began to shape up in the early 1970s at the grocery store, as she worked to organize the workers’ union.

During this time, Judi studied karate for self-defense purposes and achieved a black belt, the highest level of mastery in the martial art.

A few years later, she broke gender barriers by passing a civil service test requiring her to lift and shoulder a 70 pound mail bag for carrying. She then got a job as a bulk-mail handler at a mail center near Washington, D.C. and continued her organizing and activism in labor unions. She published the employee newsletter and put to use some of what she had learned in her five aimless years in college, namely graphic design principles. At this job, she also led a successful union strike to demand better working conditions.

After meeting her husband, Mike Sweeney, she left the East coast and moved to Sonoma County, California where she and Mike were married and had two children, Lisa and Jessica. Around the time of the move, since Judi was no longer working, the focus of her activism shifted from labor unions to a political group called Pledge of Resistance, which stood in opposition of the United States governmental support of repressive regimes throughout Central America. She and Mike divorced several years later and shared custody of the two children.

Judi’s most important and most noted work began in 1988, when she became the contact person for an organization called Earth First! in Mendocino County, California. The group aimed to tackle environmental issues and work for the protection of the environment through direct, nonviolent action and protest. Judi says she was inspired to pay more attention to environmental issues while working as a carpenter, building a home for a wealthy business executive. She noticed the beauty and quality of the boards she was working with and began to ask questions, only to find out that the wood had come from ancient Redwood trees. Judi was enraged to find out that such a part of our natural heritage was being exploited this way. She was first attracted to Earth First!, she said, because they were the only ones willing to sacrifice themselves, and put themselves in front of chainsaws and bulldozers in order to save the giant trees. She was also greatly drawn to the organizations philosophy of biocentrism, the idea that Earth is not here purely for human consumption, and that as a part of the whole, human beings need to learn to live in balance with nature rather than attempting to mold nature to suit their lifestyles.

Most of her work aimed at organizing demonstrations and protests to stop timber companies from logging and exploiting the forests, and to speak out against the way the companies were operating.

Her first campaign was a blockade of logging on public land near Cahto Park in California. She and the other protesters helped to save several thousand acres of forest, which in turn was added by the state to the protected Cahto Wilderness Area. She was also a prime organizer of efforts to save the famous Headwaters Forest in Humbolt County, California, which I’ll talk more about later.

Also in 1988, Judi was introduced to Darryl Cherney after a mutual friend suggested that she help him with the graphic design of the brochure he was making to support his run for Congress. The two quickly became a couple, and a team, and worked together on everything.

Judi was also a feminist, and is credited with feminizing the Earth First! organization. According to Mendocino Environmental Center Coordinator Betty Ball, Judi’s influence allowed many more women to become involved in ways that they could have more of an influence on the organization than ever before. She also said that Judi understood the importance of activism being a community activity, and understood the level of organizing required to make this happen. Judi is credited, in turn, with helping to make Earth First! a community campaign, moving it away from the nomadic way it used to be, as a few people bouncing from place to place and demonstrating. “When Greg King and I were organizing demonstrations, dozens and maybe hundreds of people came, but when Judi got involved, thousands of people came,” said Cherney, in regards to her prowess as an organizer.

Judi continued other types of activism throughout her environmentalist action. In 1988, she defended an abortion clinic from an anti-abortion demonstration. In 1989, she returned to her work as a labor union activist and fought for the workers of the timber industries that she so opposed. She saw the corporations as an enemy to humanity, the environment, and their own workers, and worked to convince the workers of this. In 1990, she and many timber industry workers organized and convinced the county to take back 300,000 acres of forest from the Louisiana-Pacific timber company and operate them according to public interests, so that they would not be destroyed.

In all of her activism, two things that Judi regarded as powerful were nonviolence and music. She wrote music and was almost never at a demonstration without her violin, which she had learned to play in high school and used as a unifying tool at demonstrations, and as a weapon against what was being demonstrated against by singing her the charged songs that she wrote. Likewise, she taught and practiced nonviolent direct action, leading demonstrations that aimed to show the timber workers through peaceful action that Earth First! was not a threat to their jobs, and that the corporations they worked for were the real enemy.

Her ability to organize workers against their own employers gave her the inside edge in the so-called Timber War. Her power to unite and build alliances between timber industry employees and the massive following of environmentalists she had as followers scared the corporations and made Judi a target. She was first targeted in 1989, when her car was rammed by a logging truck, hospitalizing her and six others, four of which were children. Although Judi was able to show through photographs that the truck that had hit her was the same truck which Earth First! activists had stopped in a blockade less than 24 hours prior, authorities refused to treat it as anything more than a traffic accident.

In 1990, California state senate had proposed that Preposition 130, the Forests Forever Initiative would appear on their fall ballot. The Initiative, if passed would create preventative measures against the over-cutting of Redwood forests, and would slow logging by the giant timber corporations. Of course, the companies opposed the Initiative greatly. Judi and Darryl stepped into action once again and began to organize one of their largest projects yet, the Redwood Summer project. They drew inspiration from the Mississippi Summer Civil Rights Campaign, in which students were recruited by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee to demonstrate and fight for civil rights. The project’s plan was to protect the forests with manpower to ensure that they weren’t all chopped down before the initiative could actually be passed. So, Judi and Darryl set off, touring colleges to recruit fighters for their cause. Timber companies began to launch campaigns against Earth First!, trying to discredit their name by labeling them eco-terrorists, despite the fact that the group practiced only nonviolent action. The company tried to label the initiative as the eco-terrorists’ work, to sway public opinion in their favor. Judi and other activists also began receiving death threats by mail, telephone, and even left hanging on the door of the Earth First! offices at the Mendocino Environmental Center. Attached to the last threat was a picture of Judi’s face with a target drawn on it, as well as a yellow ribbon—the symbol of the corporate-sponsored support groups of the timber companies. Judi reported the threat to the county sheriff, only to be told, “When you turn up dead, then we’ll investigate.”

On May 24, 1990, while Judi and Darryl were driving through Oakland, a car bomb exploded underneath her driver’s seat. The explosion shattered Judi’s pelvis and tailbone, and caused extensive tissue and nerve damage. Judi was left paralyzed and in pain for the rest of her life.

The Oakland Police Department and FBI terrorist squad came to the scene and began investigating. Within hours, while Judi and Darryl were both hospitalized, they were arrested for knowingly transporting the bomb, and bail was set at $100,000. The authorities said that the pair had intended to use the bomb in their fight with the timber companies, and it had accidentally exploded.  Though the pair maintained that they had nothing to do with the bomb, the FBI and police kept giving interviews to the media claiming that they did, and that there was evidence to show that Judi had built the bomb. As attention to the story built to a national scale, the public was hearing all over that Judi and Darryl were to blame. However, after two months, no evidence had turned up. The District Attorney refused to press charges due to the lack of evidence, and substantial evidence that showed the FBI had fabricated the whole investigation in the first place. No other suspects have ever been identified or even looked for, and the two were still considered to be suspects by the FBI, even though agents would later testify in court that no evidence had ever existed to incriminate Judi or Darryl in the first place.

Many saw the bombing as a final attempt to take Judi out and discredit Earth First!, trying to further label them as violent extremists and stop the Redwood Summer project from proceeding, as well as Preposition 130 from passing. Ironically, the FBI Special Agent in charge of the area at the time was Richard Held, who had headed COINTELPRO in the 1960s and ‘70s. COINTELPRO’s objectives were to disrupt the Black Panther and American Indian Movements. Held’s work led to the arrests of Geronimo Pratt and Leonard Peltier, both widely considered political prisoners, held for crimes that they did not commit. Consequently, Held resigned once Judi filed suit and presented evidence that the FBI’s investigation was a fraud.

Judi and Darryl brought suit against the Oakland Police and FBI for falsely arresting them on the grounds of an illegal, politically-charged and falsified investigation by the FBI.

Though paralyzed, Judi continued her activism, fighting for many different causes. She also remained an organizer for Earth First! “They blew up the wrong end of me,” Bari said, referring to the fact that the blast caught her legs but not her head. On September 15, 1995, Judi was the first of hundreds to be peacefully arrested at Headwaters Forest, bringing the situation to national attention. One year later, Bari was the keynote speaker at a similar demonstration at a similar spot, where over 1000 nonviolent activists were arrested for peacefully crossing onto timber company land.

Judi died on March 2, 1997 of sudden, severe breast cancer.

In 2002, the suit that she and Darryl had brought on the FBI and Oakland police department finally ended. A jury awarded Judi and Darryl $4.4 million for the violation of their first amendment right to free speech, by way of arguing that the attempt to frame them and discredit their voice limited their free speech.

Even though she’s passed, the same thing is still happening. Judi’s friend Kelpie Wilson says that Kate Coleman’s so-called biography The Secret Wars of Judi Bari is a blatant attempt at character assassination, disguised as a biography. She says that Coleman never met Judi, and didn’t bother interviewing any of her close friends or associates. Instead, her major sources are four of Judi’s opponents from the Timber War.

It is indeed a strong voice that attempts at character and actual assassination can’t kill. Judi’s legacy lives on in her 1994 book, Timber Wars, as well as through the many articles and songs she wrote during her time as an activist, and the many fighters out there who were inspired by her and still fight the struggles that she created.

“She was a wonderful inspiration to all of us and a steadfast champion of our natural heritage,” said California Senator Tom Hayden. “She was instrumental in bringing the plight of the ancient redwood forests to national attention. We will sorely miss the energy she provided, particularly in the negotiating fog that envelopes the Headwaters forest today, but she has left a legacy of dedicated activists who will carry her banner flying high.”

Wilson, Nicholas. Judi Bari Dies But Her Spirit Lives On. Judi Bari Website of the Redwood Summer Justice Project. Dec. 3, 2002.

Wilson, Nicholas. Jury Awards $4.4 Million Damages to Bari and Cherney. Monitor Publishing. June 11, 2002.

Wilson, Kelpie. Judi Bari Survives Character Assassination. t r u t h o u t. Jan. 19, 2005.

Related:

• Pharmaceutical Companies: The American Way

With Berlin still smouldering and the War in the Pacific raging, Franklin Roosevelt’s death in April of 1945 signified an end to four decades of American ‘isolationism’ in world affairs. There would be no return to the period of ‘normalcy’ which Warren Harding pledged after the First World War, nor would America be able to ignore the economic responsibilities to her allies across the Atlantic: desperate for money which would help rebuild five years of death and destruction. The technologies which had been produced at an astounding rate during the war, and the advancement of these in almost every scientific field, culminated in America’s development of the atomic bomb. One man now possessed the power to kill not thousands but hundreds of thousands in a single military order: the President of the United States. In 1945, this man was Harry S. Truman.

A former haberdasher from Missouri, Truman felt very much out of depth in his role as President and Commander-in-Chief. His first priority was to end the war in the Pacific, where American troops were fighting a brutal campaign against the Japanese. Two weeks after assuming office, Truman was informed by Secretary of War Stimson that the atom bomb was in its final stages of completion and would be ready for deployment within four months: information even in his capacity as Vice President he had not possessed. With pressure from the military to test their new toy and the American public to see victory in the Pacific, Truman ordered the release of the first and only nuclear devices in history. Hiroshima was flattened on August 6, 1945; Nagasaki followed suit three days later. The dropping of the atomic bombs precipitated three crucial factors which irrevocably shaped the Twentieth Century: a Cold War with the Soviet Union; the creation of a vast military-industrial complex conjoined by a national security state; and, most directly, the power of the Presidency.

As the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a forty year Cold War, the office of the Presidency became the first and last line of defence for the Western hemisphere. A direct consequence of the burgeoning power of the executive branch is subsumed below:

“The emerging rules of the Cold War, in part conditioned by the developing technology and speed of military action in the jet age, meant that the president had to take a lead in responding to any emerging crisis. Congress and the Constitution would have to follow in his wake” (Bennett; 2000; p. 46).

The relationship between the Executive Branch and Congress formed one of the principal duels of the century as an increasing number of presidents saw foreign affairs as their private domain. Domestic policy was of little interest to the new Presidency, international affairs were where an incumbent could make his historical mark. As Robert Harrison notes, a curious phenomenon was taking place in American politics:

“Each president is expected to define a project for his Administration, if he is to be remembered by posterity, and is judged in accordance with his success in achieving it” (Harrison; 1997; p. 320).

The electorate now placed their faith in an individual to change not only their own quality of life, but that of those who looked to America for guidance, financial support and ‘salvation.’ In short, citizens no longer remained faithful to any one party but elected their Congressmen, Senators and Presidents based on personality rather than substance. In a large part, television and the media influenced American choices, habits and popular thought which changed their perception of a powerful leader. FDR would likely not have been voted into office, nor enjoyed the luxury of a four-term office, had Americans been relentlessly subjected to the image of a President confined to a wheelchair. The personal became political within the sphere of the Oval Office during the Twentieth Century: visual images; television debates; individual excesses and scandals could make or break a President. Indeed, the last President of the Twentieth Century, William Clinton, will ‘be remembered by posterity’ more for his sexual dalliances than any professional merits of his Presidency. One President would endure a half-century battle with the media-both in being elected to office and being wrenched from it. Among the troops steaming home from the Pacific in 1945 was a thirty-two year old Lieutenant Commander who in the following year would begin his dubious rise to political fame, ending three decades later in disaster both for himself-the first President to avoid impeachment by resigning, and the country: this was none other than Richard Milhous Nixon.

One of the most complex, brilliant and flawed men ever to become President of the United States, Richard Nixon was a fascinating character of Shakespearian proportions. Achieving notoriety extremely early in his career, he was the principal protagonist behind the Alger Hiss case during the early fifties and became Vice-President to Dwight Eisenhower at the age of thirty-nine. In 1960, he narrowly lost the Presidential election to John F. Kennedy, a moment which scarred Nixon for the rest of his life and indirectly led to his infamous downfall. Two years later, after having lost the California Governorship, he announced his retirement from politics, declaring: “…this will be my last press conference.” Six years later, Nixon defeated Hubert Humphrey and made an unbelievable comeback in becoming the thirty-seventh President of the Unites States. His presidency was shaped by an America divided by the Vietnam War on the one hand, and a president who revolutionised East-West relations on the other. For most, however, Nixon brings to mind only one word: Watergate.

The Watergate scandal which engulfed the Nixon Presidency and brought that Administration to its knees has had a lasting impact on American politics. Mistrust of government and holders of high office resulted most recently in less than half of registered voters turning up to the polls in the last Presidential election. The acts of illegality and subterfuge which Nixon engaged in throughout his career are still being assessed as new evidence constantly comes to light. One principal reason for this is the fact that only a third of the Nixon White House tapes have been documented. In addition, a horde of classified documents have yet to be studied. However, Anthony Summers’ monumental work on Nixon, The Arrogance of Power, has unearthed many damning pieces of previously restricted files which incriminate Nixon far further than the Watergate burglary. Indeed, every point of Nixon’s personal and political career has come under scrutiny in this study, and his case is well documented. Though the book suffers in part by what Christopher Hitchens identifies as “…the weasel word ‘reportedly’” (Hitchens; 2001; p. 136), Summers main attacks on Nixon are substantiated with strong evidence. Among the notable indictments of Nixon’s legacy are questions about the legitimacy of every office Nixon held in public service; a scathing attack on his mental health; involvement with the mafia and extremely dubious business enterprises; abuse and incompetence in his Presidential administration; and unequivocal proof that Nixon ‘stole’ the 1968 Presidential election.

This dissertation will examine these new findings in depth and place them within a pattern of systematic contempt for the basic principles of decency and law which Nixon consistently flaunted. Focusing on the 1968 election, I will propose that the heaviest indictment of Nixon comes not from the Watergate controversy but with his machinations during the 1968 campaign in which he meddled with what a number of historical commentators have labelled the ‘most important diplomatic negotiations in American History.’ By doing so, not only did Nixon secure office by the most illegal and un-Constitutional methods, but needlessly sacrificed a further 20,000 American lives while heightening the domestic turmoil America experienced in this era. This paper is divided into three parts: the first will concentrate on Nixon’s background and electoral practices prior to 1968. In this way I will establish a pattern of illegality and paranoia which was evident in Nixon’s career as early as his University days. This part will include a section on the 1960 election and the dramatic effect this had on Nixon’s psyche. The second part of this paper will focus on the 1968 election and will include a speculative consideration of what America could have expected from a Humphrey administration. The third section will examine the Administrative mood of the Nixon White House and the planned break-in of the Brookings institution to secure incriminating documents relating to the 1968 election. I will conclude by examining the lasting impact of Nixon’s Presidency on American politics and electoral habits.

Chapter 1: ‘Kicking Nixon Around’

“The old adage, ‘character is destiny’, decidedly applies to Richard Nixon. He created a presidency, staffed his White House, and conducted his relations with Congress all in such a way that made Watergate inevitable. Nixon got into the Watergate mess because he was Nixon” (Kurz; 1998; p. 273).

Yorba Linda, California is a desolate and lonely rural pocket governed predominately by old the fashioned values of the Quaker tradition. Born into a strict and, according to Nixon, poor family ^[1], Richard grew up with the stern authority of both his father’s belt and his mother’s doctrinaire lectures. By the age of eighteen, Nixon had begun a lifelong passion for eavesdropping when: “In Arizona, (his brother) Harold figured out a method of intercepting a girlfriend’s phone conversations with a rival suitor, which was probably Richard’s first experience of wiretapping” (Summers; 2000; p. 11). By the age of eighteen, Nixon endured the setback which would begin a life-long resentment. Having won a scholarship to Harvard, he was informed by his parents that they had neither the money to fund his expenses nor the ability to lose his labour. He would not go east to college, what he describes as a ‘dream’ in his memoirs:

“Once that dream ended, and for the rest of his life, he indulged an obsession about entitlement and social class” (Summers; 2000; p. 15).

Nixon went to Whittier College, where two factors would foreshadow events to come in his political career. Angered by the ostentatious presence of the social elite, named the Franklins, who wore expensive clothes and hosted exclusive dinners, Nixon formed a rival club named the Orthogonians. Representing the ‘everyman’, Nixon was elected president of the student body, having campaigned on an issue which he had no interest in whatsoever: being allowed to dance on campus. This was a pattern repeated in virtually every political position Nixon attempted. From the ‘little man’ rallying for the common good against the evil of internal Communism to calling on the ‘silent majority’ in 1968, Nixon presented himself to the electorate in strictly Manichean terms. In addition, Nixon displayed little or no concern for the issues at hand, as in 1968 when he took the most important political factor of that decade- ending the war in Vietnam, and proceeded to use it to gain the Presidency.

While attending Whittier an incident occurred which displayed another emerging pattern in the Nixon psyche. At the end of his second year, Nixon and two contemporaries broke into the Dean’s office in an apparent bid to get an advance look at their grades. The penalty for such an offence would obviously have been expulsion, if not criminal charges. Yet, the grades were to be released imminently; they had merely been delayed in being sent. Nixon and his accomplices had thus taken a massive risk in attaining results which could not have been altered: this was to be a mistake repeated by Nixon so callously that the Watergate scandal seemed almost inevitable. Decades before, however, Nixon was engaging in a series of ‘dirty tricks’ which would set the tone of his 1968 Presidential campaign.

Electoral Practices Prior to 1960

“During the early years, Nixon was the man to beat. He was the best politician of his time, articulating more ably than anyone the nervous mood of post-World War II America” (Matthews; 1996; p. 15).

Nixon began his political career in 1946 when he ran for Congress against Democratic incumbent Jerry Voorhis. A dedicated New Dealer, Voorhis had faced no serious challenge to his position since 1937. With the war over, however, the GOP began a counter-attack on the Democratic hegemony it had enjoyed since the Great Depression. Though the fear of subversion by Socialist and Communist forces had been a prevalent force in the American psyche since the revolution of 1917, it was not until the United States began an all-out Cold War with the Soviet Union that anti-Communism reached epidemic proportions. Nixon tapped into this hysteria, along with a great number of GOP hopefuls, during the 1946 Congressional campaign. Influenced heavily by Churchill’s speech in March of that year in Fulton, Missouri where the latter announced that “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent” (quoted in Ambrose; 1971; p. 70), Nixon took up the anti-Communist call with ferocity. Every victim in his political legacy has been plagued primarily through the only common theme in Nixon’s campaigns, red-baiting: from the claim that Voorhis was funded by the Communist Political Action Committee; to the assertion that Helen Douglas was ‘pink down to her underwear’; and finally in his 1968 campaign that Humphrey was a ‘sincere, dedicated radical.’

The 1946 campaign against Voorhis was, by all accounts, “brutal and vicious” (Kurz; 1998; p. 46). It was at this time that Nixon met the man who would coordinate the ‘dirty tricks’ of his career: Murray Chotiner. Nixon would later claim as a defence that he engaged in illegal methods of obtaining office only in response to those rallied against him. This line of argument forms the central tenet of Nixon loyalists, who argue that any criticism of Nixon’s actions come under the ‘politics-as-usual’ heading. Yet, as Kenneth Kurz makes clear: “‘Politics as usual’ is not a license for abetting criminals and committing crimes” (Kurz; 1998; p. 274). Nixon saw politics as a game, one where the there were no rules save that of ‘survival of the fittest.’ Nixon apologists state that Nixon’s only crime was getting caught, yet the standard he set in the initial Congressional campaign against Voorhis and his subsequent Senatorial campaign against Helen Douglas suggest otherwise. A number of the common tactics applied by politicians today: massive financial contributions, media ‘spin’ and the infiltration of an opposition camp, were used heavily in Nixon’s early years. In 1946, Chotiner planted Nixon supporters at Voorhis’ rallies, courted big business and arranged for the Los Angeles Times to run favourable headline coverage of the campaign sympathetic to Nixon. In addition, voters were beleaguered by calls which informed the recipient: “I think you should know Jerry Voorhis is a Communist.” Recent evidence cited by Summers indicates that it was Chotiner who arranged those calls. Nixon’s camp spent an estimated $30,000^[2]; Voorhis a paltry $2,000. In the 2000 gubernatorial campaign, all but one of the contenders who spent the more money ‘won’ their elective office.

The 1950 Senatorial campaign against Helen Douglas was a near re-rerun of the Voorhis episode. This time, however, Nixon became nastier. Again using the red-baiting tactic as the main prong of his attack, Chotiner assembled a massive one to two million dollar fund ^[3]. So much money, in fact, that Nixon was able to donate a portion to other GOP candidates. Hecklers were positioned, as before, at Douglas’ speaking engagements and this time callers were subjected to racial slurs which asked “Did you know?” followed by an allusion to Douglas’ Jewish husband. On more than one occasion Nixon referred to Douglas as Hesselberg ^[4], a clearly anti-Semitic attack. The press, too, were employed by Chotiner to project pro-Nixon sentiment: “Of twelve papers in the state, nine backed Nixon” (Summers; 2000; p. 83). Nixon labelled Douglas ‘pink down to her underwear’, a remark which resonated all the more now that China had entered the Korean War. With anti-Communist sentiment at its peak, and with a little help from Chotiner, Nixon won with a resounding majority: 2,183, 454 votes to Douglas’s 1, 502, 507 ^[5].

Nixon’s early political bids showed that he was not immune to using coercive methods in order to obtain votes. Many of the themes evident in his 1968 Presidential candidacy were apparent by 1952: the distortion of a central issue to further his advancement; massive campaign contributions; and the abuse of the media in changing voter perception. Public opinion of the Senator from California soon began to sway:

“To many, Nixon seemed to be a man on the make, a hustler peddling falsehoods, an obvious dealer in illusions” (Bennett; 2000; p. 127).

The term first coined by Helen Douglas, ‘Tricky Dick’, was beginning to stick. This was no more heightened by what Nixon describes in Six Crises as: “…the most scarring personal crisis of my life” (Nixon; 1962; p. 74). Allegations that the Vice-Presidential hopeful had solicited money from California’s big business for personal use were beginning to cast doubts on the integrity of the Republican Party’s brightest hope for victory in 1960. In what was to be the first in a series of public evaluations, Nixon went on camera to defend the charges levelled against him. In what can only be described as pathetic, Nixon used the now familiar rhetoric of the ‘common man’ to appeal to the sentiment of the American public. Ending this diatribe with the assertion that no matter what would transpire when all was said and done, the family dog Checkers ^[6] would remain. A potential disaster was averted, the general public admired what they perceived as Nixon’s candour and he was once again welcomed back into the bosom of the Republican Party.

The fund scandal, although a public relations success, had two long-lasting effects on Nixon. It began his passionate hatred for the media and provided the first conclusive evidence that Nixon was liable to emotional outbursts under pressure. As Nixon saw it, the press had jumped on him for an act of which many other politicians, including Adlai Stevenson, could easily have been indicted. In addition, Nixon’s emotional fragility meant that he took what the press said and their actions personally: “I had not reckoned with the determination and skilful planning of our opponents” (Nixon; 1962; p. 83). As it became clear that Nixon had dodged the fund crisis, serious cracks were beginning to show in his ability to stand up to the pressures of high office:

“From then on Nixon surrendered to tears: tears after making his Checkers speech, tears on board his plane in front of embarrassed reporters when Eisenhower came on board to say ‘you’re my boy,’ and the famous tears on Senator William Knowland’s shoulder ^[7]…” (Summers; 2000; p. 138).

In 1968, however, there were to be no tears: only victory. Nixon’s commitment to winning the Presidency, and the methods employed to gain it, were hardened by the most defining moment of his political career: 1960.

Kennedy and the 1960 Presidential Election

In 1960, two conjoined resentments Nixon had developed-against both the ‘liberal eastern establishment’ and the media-came to fruition. John F. Kennedy, the Democratic nominee for President, encapsulated everything Nixon wasn’t: privileged, wealthy and exceedingly handsome. Kennedy launched his platform on a campaign to ‘get this country moving again’ while Nixon resorted to the tried and tested anti-Communist line which had to date served him in good stead. Interestingly, Nixon and Kennedy had known each other well in the post-war period as both their political careers appeared to mirror each other: in the Senate they had even kept offices opposite one another. In 1960, however, any effort to rekindle the once friendly rivalry had abated: for Nixon this was all out war.

Nixon was far more experienced than Kennedy in political campaigning and world affairs. Yet, the Kennedy clan were able to use Nixon’s tricks against him. JFK argued that Eisenhower had been soft on Communism: he cited a purported ‘missile gap’ and, more importantly, the loss of ‘Cuba’ to the enemy. The most defining moment of the election came in a revolutionary medium which marked the fundamental sway of American politics from those of party loyalty or concrete issues to personality: television debates. The first ever such debate, on September 26, has gone down as somewhat of a political legend. Kennedy looked like ‘a young Adonis’ while his counterpart looked exactly as he was: a man straight out of hospital. Having bumped his knee weeks earlier, Nixon had to be hospitalised as the wound became infected. While in hospital, Nixon recalls a moment which tells much about his obsession with politics:

“The physical pain I suffered those next few weeks was bad enough…But the mental suffering was infinitely worse” (Nixon; 1962; p. 336).

Presumably, his mental anguish emanated from his failure to be out on the campaign trail. By stating that his emotional faculties were more inhibited than those of a potentially life-altering injury ^[8], Nixon implicates by default the inner workings of an incredibly flawed psyche. Before the first television debate, Nixon bumped the injured knee before arriving at the studio. Watching footage of the debate, it is clear that he is in a considerable amount of discomfort as his knee shakes sporadically. In addition, he refused make-up. Emaciated, pale and visibly ‘shaken’, Nixon looked positively haggard in comparison to the tanned and lean figure of JFK. Nixon had underestimated the power of the media and was duly punished. A series of miscalculations had led to a public relations disaster: Nixon’s refusal to prepare for the event; the decision not to wear make-up; and his underestimation of Kennedy’s debating skills. Though Nixon sounded the better politician-he won far more acclaim via radio than television- Kennedy looked ‘presidential.’ This was a defining moment in American political history: JFK gave the image of a president. From that point on, politicians became fully aware of the power of the media over the electorate. Nixon never grasped this idea, and as such maintained until Watergate that the media, in collusion with the Liberal establishment, were out to get him: “I was prepared to do combat with the media…I did not believe this combat would be between equals” (Nixon; 1978; p. 355). It was not that they were necessarily out to get ‘him’, but that he refused to accept the importance of sustaining a symbiotic relationship with the media. In addition, Nixon displayed a contempt for the very people who put him in office: in Six Crises he refers to “unsophisticated voters” and unsophisticated televiewers” (Nixon; 1962; pp. 38-39) in almost the same breath. The defining blow, however, came on Election Day: Nixon lost out to Kennedy by a little over 100,000 votes. Once more, Nixon’s emotional fragility presented itself:

“I had seen many people in tears the night before as they heard the returns, but for the first time I was confronted with the same problem” (Nixon; 1962; p. 393).

Tears quickly turned to suspicion, as the reports from Chicago and Texas indicated voting fraud. In later years, Nixon developed a wild and paranoiac interpretation of the election:

“Nixon clung to the absurd conspiracy theory that the agency (CIA) had conspired to make him lose the 1960 presidential election to Kennedy” (Andrew; 1995; p. 350).

No evidence has yet come to light that the CIA prevented Nixon’s victory, yet there is substantial proof that the Democratic campaign management had bought or forced voters into casting a Kennedy ballot. Seymour Hersh’s The Dark Side of Camelot contains the most recent analysis of an election which to his mind was decidedly Nixon’s. Depressed at his loss, angry at the electorate and fermenting vast conspiracy theories which centred around the media, Nixon was forced to endure the ultimate humiliation. Asked to come by Kennedy for what he thought was a genuine effort at reconciliation, Nixon met the president elect in Florida. There, under the auspices of having a meaningful and productive conversation on how to conduct Presidential policy ^[9], Kennedy delivered the fatal blow:

“…Kennedy was now having his way with his rival, listening obligingly to Nixon’s advice for the sole purpose of getting Nixon’s television picture paying court to him as the president-elect” (Matthews; 1996; p.186).

The election of 1960 proved to be cataclysmic for Nixon’s psyche. He returned to politics in 1962, losing the California governorship by another slim majority. Afterwards, Nixon informed reporters: “…you won’t have Nixon to kick around any more, because gentlemen, this is my last press conference.” Physically and emotionally shattered, Nixon poured the last three years of scorn onto the public eye. In private, there are unsubstantiated claims that he physically beat up his wife Pat. Whatever the truth of those allegations, one thing is certain: Nixon would not lose again. The governor-hopeful transformed his experiences of sixteen years in public service into a ruthless comeback for the 1968 election. In it, Nixon would deploy a combination of dirty tricks he had learned in previous campaigns with a new self-determined confidence -born of two emotionally crushing losses- to devastating effect in his bid for President of the United States.

“Politics was not merely another occupation; it was his whole life, and he could not sit out the presidential race” (Unger and Unger; 1988; p. 451).

Chapter 2: 1968

“Because so little light showed between Nixon and Humphrey on Viet Nam (sic), it is unlikely that the war played a large part in the presidential vote…The bombing suspension and the prospect of more significant negotiations may well have helped Humphrey’s momentum in the campaign’s last days.”

- Time; November 15th, 1968 (Vol. 92, No. 20); p. 19

The 1968 Presidential election was one of the most significant in American History. In four years, Johnson’s dream of a Great Society had been displaced by the Vietnam War: “Instead of friend of the poor and the oppressed, he was now presented as an evil, tyrannical monster, an ogre, a bringer of death and destruction” (Harrison; 1997; p. 303). LBJ was by no accounts the most articulate or humble of men: he demanded a ‘kiss my ass at high noon and tell me it smells like roses’ type of loyalty and was frequently given to vulgar outbursts. In a notable tirade, Johnson moaned about a future president and then Congressman: “Ford’s economics is the worst thing that’s happened to this country since pantyhose ruined finger-fucking” (quoted in Doyle; 1999; p. 144). Johnson was the President directly responsible for escalating the conflict in Vietnam, yet it is impossible to argue that Kennedy-had he enjoyed a probable second term of office- would have been better equipped to defuse the situation. In 1968, both the Vietnam War and the turmoil in America had reached epidemic proportions: between 1964-8 there were over 400 racial disturbances alone in major urban centres. In South-East Asia, the Vietcong’s Tet offensive at the end of January 1968 destroyed the Johnson Administration’s claims that an end to the quagmire was in sight. Faced with no solutions to either the war abroad or at home, Johnson announced his decision not to seek re-election in 1968. For Doris Kearns, a Johnson aide who would later help write his memoirs, the decision was made because: “Johnson’s candidacy would have caused an explosion, fragmenting, perhaps irrevocably, the Democratic Party” (Kearns; 1976; p. 351).

The election was dominated by two inter-related issues: Vietnam and civil unrest. In addition, a third party candidate-George Wallace- campaigned for racial segregation, thus enlarging and clouding the answer to civil unrest. Wallace, like all third party candidates in American History, had no chance of winning: his platform, however, drew dismayed Republican voters in from the cold that deemed Nixon too moderate. The lessons of 1960 had been learnt: Nixon transformed his image to secure victory in ’68. Frank Meyer had noted by August in the National Review that:

“This was a very different Nixon from the always cautious, often trimming, Nixon of 1960. If the rest of the campaign is conducted on this level, conservatives can support the Republican ticket with confidence” (National Review; August 27th 1968; Vol. 20, No. 34; p. 859).

Nixon believed the most effective strategy for success would be adopting a ‘centrist’ line: he promised ‘peace with honour’ and maintained that he had a ‘secret plan’ to end the war. In one example of Nixon’s pathological lying, he alleges: “I never said I had a ‘plan’, much less a ‘secret plan’, to end the war; I was deliberately straightforward about the difficulty of finding a solution” (Nixon; 1978; p. 298). Domestically, Nixon appealed to ‘the silent majority’-those who he named as the ‘true Americans’ not responsible for the endemic violence in the country- to place their trust in him. According to Bennett: “Rebuilding the trust between presidency and people was the key task for any incoming president in 1968″ (Bennett; 2000; p.128). Nixon tapped into the popular fears of the nation-as in previous campaigns- promising all things to all people. The Democrats, meanwhile, had been experiencing a severe power struggle. Johnson’s Vice-President Hubert Humphrey was first choice for nominee until Bobby Kennedy entered the arena. For a moment, Nixon was paralysed with déjà vu from 1960. These fears abated in early June when Kennedy was assassinated by a Jordanian nationalist seconds after accepting nomination. Nixon campaigned diligently on a ‘peace with honour’ line while Humphrey attempted to patch up the divisions in his party. As Nixon states: “I knew, of course, that the impact of Humphrey’s nomination would now be seriously undermined. He would have to spend his entire campaign trying to patch up the divisions in his party” (Nixon; 1978; p. 317). Humphrey’s acceptance speech for nomination reflects Nixon’s analysis:

“There are differences, of course, serious differences within our party on this vexing and painful issue of Vietnam…Put aside recrimination and dissension. Believe-believe in what America can do, and believe in what America can be…” (in Engelmayer and Wagman; 1978; p. 296).

In the run-up to the penultimate week of the election, Nixon was well clear of Humphrey in the polls. At this point, it seemed that Nixon would receive the landslide majority he had consistently yearned for. Orthodox interpretations of the 1968 election indicate that Nixon won because of a ‘conservative backlash’ which had begun in the New Deal era and had now reacted to eight years of liberalism. Among them, Michael Heale:

“Richard Nixon’s election was made possible by the crumbling of the New Deal Order, by disillusion with New Frontier and Great Society Liberalism, and by the sorry Johnson record in Vietnam. His re-election represented a repudiation of street politics” (Heale; 2001; p. 107).

This interpretation is justified in the sense that America had lost faith in the ‘politics of hope’ imbued in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Every segment of American society seemed to have validated criticisms of the preceding eight years: from blacks and whites who were still economically marginalised; middle-class America who wanted stability; and the young who yearned for peace. The electorate-it is argued- looked to the Republican Party to reverse the trend of liberalism which had so degraded American economic, social and military strength. Nixon was voted to bring an end to the domestic and international crises which-it was perceived- had their roots in the Democratic Party. For Doris Kearns “…what changed between 1964 and 1968 was not people’s attitudes towards the policies which Johnson espoused…but their level of trust in Johnson’s capacity to cope with domestic and international problems” (Kearns; 1976; p. 337). There are two problems with this interpretation: Nixon-however much he had changed his image- was still heavily mistrusted:

“Many Americans had voted for Richard Nixon for high office: senator, governor, vice-president, president, but few had loved him. He inspired little affection because he seemed so incapable of love. Pain, anger, resentment, self-pity, hatred- but not love” (Unger and Unger; 1988; p. 451).

Nixon’s past had not erased in the minds of many the red-baiting Congressman who had vilified Alger Hiss in a nation-wide HUAC case. Conversely, Nixon was visibly attempting to shed this image in an attempt to garner trust among the electorate. Theodore White even went as far as to comment “…I came to believe that one must respect this man: there was about all he said a conviction and sincerity” (White; 1969; p. 148).  James Jackson Kilpatrick, however, noted a somewhat different phenomenon:

“Nixon took a new tack at Cincinnati on October 21. ‘We’re gonna sock it to ‘em,’ he cried. Instantly, the shade of Mrs Douglas appeared upon the scene: the Ole Debbil Nixon had returned, blue beard and all” (National Review; December 3, 1968; Vol. 20, No. 34).

The ‘Ole Debbil Nixon’ certainly had returned. New evidence has now proven a long known ‘secret’ about the 1968 Presidential campaign: that Richard Nixon engaged in clandestine negotiations with the South Vietnamese promising them a ‘better deal’ if a Republican Administration were elected. In doing so, Nixon may well have prolonged the war for a further four years and enjoyed a two-term Presidency which was never his. The deception of all involved- Johnson, the troops, the American people and the South Vietnamese- sheds new light on the traditional ‘conservative backlash’ argument while suggesting that Nixon was capable of far more than the ordering of a break-in at the Watergate.

On October 1st- a week before the election- Johnson announced a full bombing halt of North Vietnam, to be followed by peace talks in Paris. He assured the public this was a non-partisan move designed solely in the interests of securing an end to the war. The move obviously came under criticism as a political ploy to aid the trailing Humphrey, yet as long as the peace talks began, Johnson could enjoy being heralded as the man who ended the war. Humphrey’s gap did indeed diminish – as the electorate saw an end to the Vietnam War- to give him a slight lead in the polls. On November 2nd, South Vietnam announced that they would not be attending the Peace Talks, and Johnson’s claim that the bombing halt was an apolitical move seemed unsubstantiated. As Ambrose succinctly puts it:

“After having gone seven months without comment on Vietnam, using the excuse that he did not want to undercut the President, Nixon decided to undercut the President” (Ambrose; 1989; p. 209).

As a result of Nixon’s ‘intervention’ in the peace talks, it is entirely likely that enough votes were swung to bring him victory. About a year before the 1968 elections, a meeting had been arranged between Nixon and Anna Chennault, an Asian affairs expert with long-standing ties to the Republican Party. ^[10] In it, she agreed to act as an adviser to Nixon on Vietnam. Within a year, her role had changed dramatically: by November of 1968 Nixon was using Chennault as a conduit- via Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem- to President Thieu. When Johnson received word that Thieu was backing out of the peace initiative, information gathered from wiretaps and phone intercepts of the South Vietnamese embassy became clear. Convinced that Nixon was involved, Johnson ordered a full physical and electronic surveillance of both the embassy and Chennault. From that surveillance came two previously classified FBI documents which incriminate Nixon. In the first, Chennault:

“…contacted Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem, and advised him that she had received a message from her boss, which her boss wanted her to give personally to the Ambassador. She said the message was ‘Hold on, we are gonna win…”

(Summers; 2000; p. 302).

The evidence here is circumspect. On its own the conclusion can be drawn that the message is from an unnamed ‘boss’ in the Republican Party urging Thieu to resist pressure from the Johnson Administration to attend the peace talks. The indication that ‘we’re gonna win’ is a reminder that the South Vietnamese would fair better with Nixon in the White House. Taken in conjunction with a second FBI phone intercept, however, the identity of the ‘boss’ becomes virtually undisputable:

“The person she had mentioned to Diem who might be thinking about ‘The Trip’ went on vacation this afternoon and will be returning Monday morning…”

(Summers; 2000; p. 305).

Nixon had left for Florida to relax after winning the election, and Chennault was recorded mentioning that she had been ‘talking to Florida’ (Summers; 2000; p. 304). Given this new evidence and the fact that Chennault has always maintained that Nixon was her ‘boss’ ^[11], it is now clear that the President-elect had won office using the most morally repugnant methods. In doing so, Nixon displays a truly evil characteristic which goes far beyond the ‘politics-as-usual’ defence. His machinations bring an entirely new interpretation to the 1968 election and the motives of a president who was voted into office on the understanding that he would end the war.

Johnson, crude as he was, took great pains in sacrificing American lives overseas. In the dying hours of his presidency, he had genuinely wanted to bring an end to the conflict which had so far claimed about 30,000 lives:

“The desire to leave something permanent behind as evidence of the work of a lifetime had been with him from the days of his youth, but never had it been so prevalent a force as it was in the Spring of 1968″ (Kearns; 1976; p. 344).

From March 31st- when he had called for a unilateral partial bombing halt of North Vietnam- until November, Johnson was desperately seeking resolve to the Vietnam crisis. His decision to bring a full halt in October cannot thus be seen as a last minute ditch attempt at peace. It was the culmination of months of intense work on the part of the Johnson Administration to ensure all parties concerned could begin negotiating. Dr. Kissinger, on the other hand, disagrees:

“It was one of the most fateful presidential decisions of the postwar (sic) period. Had Johnson not made this dramatic renunciation, he could have contested the election on the issue of Vietnam and secured a popular mandate one way or another” (Kissinger; 1994; p. 672).

Given the divisions in the Democratic Party, the domestic situation and the opposition to the Vietnam War from all sides, I find this analysis unlikely. More probable is the speculation that the peace talks of 1968- had the South Vietnamese attended- could well have ended the war significantly sooner than Nixon was able to. Nixon maintains that “Thieu’s reaction was totally predictable…” (Nixon; 1978; p. 328) yet Time magazine reported on November 8th that: “Thieu dispatched a three man advance party to Paris to arrange quarters and communications for an official South Vietnamese delegation to the peace talks” (Time; November 8th, 1968; Vol. 92, No. 19; p. 25). Stephen Ambrose places little importance to Nixon’s culpability:

“Nixon knew that Thieu would not go to Paris, with or without that rather silly woman whispering in his ear the promises John Mitchell was passing along from Richard Nixon. Being Nixon, he worried, and could not keep himself from trying to influence Thieu through Chennault, so he was guilty in his motives and his actions, but he was not decisive. It was not Nixon who prevented an outbreak of peace in November 1968. He merely exploited a situation he did not create”

(Ambrose; 1989; p. 217).

This argument rests heavily on the assumption that Thieu did not anticipate attending the Peace Talks. Yet, anyone who had received the ‘Johnson Treatment’ knew that ‘no’ was not a viable answer. It would be difficult to contend that Johnson would not have used all his powers to force the South Vietnamese to the negotiating table. In addition, Thieu had indicated he was seriously considering attending the talks when he sent a forward delegation to Paris. Humphrey, however, was not producing what Thieu wanted to hear:

“As President, I would stop the bombing of North Vietnam…I would move, in other words, toward de-Americanization of the war” (quoted in Engelmayer and Wagman; 1978; p. 297).

This was sure to have the South Vietnamese President more than a little concerned as to the fate of his country. Yet, the United States possessed far more bargaining power in 1968 against the North Vietnamese-before the incursions into Laos and Cambodia-than in January 1973. In addition, Johnson could easily have argued that the Democratic line would change as soon as Humphrey was elected. Given that Thieu believed Nixon’s claims to do the same, this rationale is not unsubstantiated. In retrospect, the settlements for the final Peace Treaty proved no different than those proposed in 1968: this suggests that Nixon is significantly responsible for prolonging the conflict to his own end. Summers concludes:

“The fact that Nixon covertly intervened…deliberately flouting the efforts of the American authorities, was indefensible. The way in which he involved himself remains to this day undefended” (Summers; 2000; p. 306).

Stephen Ambrose, on the other hand, suggests that the entire 1968 campaign was flawed, thus reverting to the defence Nixon would employ later in the Watergate proceedings that his actions were ‘politics-as-usual’:

“In 1968, American politics had sunk to depths not reached since the Civil War and Reconstruction. America’s political leaders, Johnson and Humphrey, Nixon and Agnew, and most of the others, were just playing with people…if it even ever occurred to the them to strive to provide the conditions that would allow the American people to pursue happiness, they managed to ignore it all in their single-minded pursuit of personal victory at any cost” (Ambrose; 1989; p. 217).

‘Dirty tricks’, however wrong, are part of the political landscape of America. Johnson had all the candidates bugged; Nixon did the same in regard to Humphrey. Republican hecklers were a prominent feature at Humphrey speeches, while in Miami- at the Republican Convention- a heavily pregnant black woman stood outside wearing a ‘Nixon’s the One’ badge. The 1968 election was the most heavily charged, passionate and tragic of the Twentieth Century. The cohesion of American society and the lives of a potential 500,000 troops hung in the balance of whose vote the election went for. In addition, Nixon used the collective aspirations of the electorate to secure votes: “We know, of course, that once begun, negotiations would drag on for almost five years. But no one could foresee such an outcome in late October 1968, and it was hopefully believed that peace talks meant peace, not just talks” (Unger and Unger; 1988; p. 528). The treachery, deceit and Machiavellian tactic employed by Nixon vis-à-vis his sabotaging of Johnson’s peace initiative went far beyond the rubric of ‘everybody does it.’ Everybody didn’t do it, and for this reason Nixon’s actions can be considered wholly treacherous to American citizens, troops and the sanctity of the Constitution: Nixon stole the election. Having assumed power under such scrupulous methods, however, Nixon now had to retain his tenuous rise to office: the stain of 1968 would weigh heavily on his actions as President.

Chapter 3: The Stain of 1968

“When Nixon opened the president’s private safe on his first morning in the White House, he found that Johnson had left only one document behind: the Vietnam intelligence summary for the previous day…Nixon put the intelligence report back in the safe. He did not remove it until the war was over”

(Andrew; 1995; p. 359).

Johnson harboured a strong suspicion that Nixon had jettisoned his peace initiative. Having relayed this suspicion to Humphrey, the Democrats were trapped with the information gathered from the FBI surveillance: to release it would have looked like a political move and would indirectly show that Johnson had been involved in domestic surveillance. Time magazine reported in January that “After the inaugural spectacle faded from the U.S. television screens last week, some of its images remained…Hubert Humphrey in the inaugural stand, jaw grimly set as he watched the man who defeated him so narrowly take the oath of office” (Time; January 31st, 1969; Vol. 93, No. 5; p. 13). Humphrey knew as well as Johnson that Nixon had betrayed the American people: they had much to fear as Nixon was sworn in as president. When Nixon opened the Presidential safe, he too was reminded by Johnson that his secret was not entirely safe. Added to his hatred of the press, the electorate and the ‘Liberal Establishment’, Nixon now had to contend with the possibility that Johnson would unravel the evidence of a ‘stolen’ presidency. For the time being, however, Nixon’s priorities were elsewhere:

“If Richard Nixon was in no undue haste to construct his Administration; he was clearly eager to make the most of his four-year lease on America’s most elegant and adaptable mansion” (Time; January 31st, 1969; Vol. 93, No.5; p. 13).

In the early days of his presidency, Nixon devoted his time to savouring in the grandeur he had for so long aspired to. Military planes were sent to Italy for expensive silk and to France for furniture: a complete re-decoration of the White House was put into operation. In addition, fully operative and secure residences were adapted for presidential use in California and Florida: “A former Budget Bureau official would calculate that, by four years into his presidency, Nixon’s household expenses had added up to a hundred million dollars” (Summers; 2000; p. 325). The ‘imperial presidency’ was beginning to take shape. Nixon’s perception of the excesses he truly believed were acceptable offer an intimate view into why his presidency crumbled. Nixon’s views on presidential power and the limits of that power are a defining factor in the acts of illegality he would pursue well in advance of Watergate. In delegating so much time, effort and expense to the pomp and show of being a president, Nixon was unable to act as a President.

A vast amount of White House memorandum attaches more importance to subservient concerns than those of national importance. One three page memo from Haldeman to Colonel Hughes discusses the choice and availability of films at Camp David. In another, the President requests of Haldeman:

“Would you please have the Bordeaux years checked? I know that ’59 is an excellent year…I would like to see, from a wine expert, what they consider to be the best years for French Bordeaux, starting with ’59, which most consider to be the best year in the last 25″ (Odes; 1989; p. 109).

Far more sinister than the quality of films or wine, however, was the level of medication now controlling the President. Exacerbated by his addition to the drug Dilantin ^[12] and his heavy drinking, Nixon’s resentment of the media and the liberal press had developed into full blown paranoia. On three documented cases, Nixon’s mental instability led to the president ordering the deployment of nuclear weapons for extremely small crises. The sacred chain-of-command which governs the use of nuclear weapons was broken when Kissinger decided that all such decisions must be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is in clear violation of the power of the president: the fact that it was necessary to preserve international security is a further indictment of Nixon’s character and responsibility while in the White House. In an allusion to the ‘enemies list’ compiled by John Dean, Kenneth Kurz notes that:

“The White House engaged in dirty tricks throughout Nixon’s first term, not just at election time. His politics-as-usual argument could not vitiate the fact that Nixon and his men spent an inordinate amount of time thinking up and implementing plans to screw their opponents” (Kurz; 1998; p. 279).

One such plan provides further evidence of Nixon’s involvement in the 1968 peace talks and suggests that he was willing to sanction the murder of innocent people to protect his presidency. In 1968, the release of the Pentagon papers had incensed both Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. The author of the Pentagon Papers –Daniel Ellsberg- had already been subjected to a smear campaign by the Nixon Administration when the office of his psychiatrist had been broken into. Now there were strong reports that Ellsberg had added a section to the Pentagon Papers on the ‘bombing halt episode’ which directly incriminated Nixon. This additional file had been kept in the Brookings Institution, a liberal think-tank about five blocks from the White House. In 1971, Nixon ordered the break-in of Brookings to secure the files. Although the plan was never completely executed ^[13], the fact that Nixon had ordered and approved the break-in displayed his utter contempt for the law and his responsibilities as President. In a series of taped conversations released in 1996, the President is clearly ordering acts of illegality. On June 30th:

“‘The way I want it handled, Bob (Haldeman) is…I want Brookings…just break in, break in and take it out…’” (Summers; 2000; p. 386).

The next day, a more determined Nixon:

“‘We’re up against an enemy, a conspiracy, they’re using any means…I want the Brookings safe cleaned out…’” (Summers; 2000; p. 386).

Nixon’s insistence that the files be stolen further compounds the argument that he feared a revelation from the contents of Ellsberg’s investigation which would reveal his secret dealings in the 1968 peace talks. Furthermore, one plan which was conceived to enter the Brookings Institution reveals the extent to which Nixon feared those revelations. The plan to break into Brookings involved fire-bombing the building, then sending in White House employees-disguised as firemen- to retrieve the files. By the time the genuine emergency services arrived, the culprits would have had time to escape in a specially camouflaged ‘fire truck.’ The plan and funding for the enterprise all originated in the White House. Both John Dean and John Ehrlichman corroborate this claim in their memoirs:

“Once before, when Nixon was in such a mood, Colson had planned to firebomb the Brookings Institution to get at its cache of secret documents” (Ehrlichman; 1982; p. 403).

“I stared out the window and wondered if the President’s mind was as cluttered as mine when he stared out his window. Garbage and tension, I thought. I knew I had to get out of this thing. It was out and out street crime. I saw fat burglars wearing stocking masks slipping behind firemen and felt a rush of revulsion” (Dean; 1976; p. 46).

The firebombing plan had originated with Nixon’s co-conspirator Chuck Colson. As of this moment, no evidence has proved that Nixon approved or ordered the fire, yet the ferocity with which he demands the break-in suggests that any means necessary were to be employed. Even Nixon concedes:

“In the aftershock of the Pentagon Papers leak…my interest in the bombing halt file was rekindled. When I was told that it was still at Brookings, I was furious and frustrated … I saw no reason for that file to be at Brookings, and I said I wanted it back right now, even if it meant having to get it back surreptitiously” (Nixon; 1978; p. 512).

Given the amount of evidence which continues to surface regarding the Nixon Presidency, it will probably only be a matter of time before the ex-President becomes directly linked to the planned firebombing of the Brookings Institution. The plan preceded and anticipated the Watergate affair, which was a comparatively innocent endeavour in light of both the 1968 election and the Brookings affair. In addition, the latter two events were intrinsically linked: Nixon needed the files in order to avoid detection of the tactics he employed to gain the Presidency. Even given the defence that the Brookings Institute was never infiltrated- by fire or any other method- the fact that Nixon even flirted with the idea is criminal in itself. The Watergate Special Prosecution Service had neither the time nor the resources to investigate his election campaign or the Brookings affair. Had they been able to, there is no doubt that such findings would have damaged American politics far more than Nixon’s legacy already has. In addition, the disgraced President would have been totally unable to procure the reconciliation with the American public undertaken in the last twenty years of his life.

Conclusion: The Impact of 1968

“Always give your best, never get discouraged, never be petty; always remember, others may hate you, but those who hate you don’t win unless you hate them, and then you destroy yourself”

1. Richard Nixon, Remarks on the Departure from the White House (quoted in Bochin; 1990; p. 170)

At Richard Nixon’s funeral in April 1994, then President Clinton called on Americans to ‘judge Richard Nixon on no less than his entire life.’ Ironically, as this paper has attempted to argue, Clinton was indirectly incriminating the ex-president on far more than the legacy of Watergate. That scandal alone has left a lingering imprint on American politics as the electorate has attempted to renew its faith in its elected leaders: voter participation has consistently depreciated since 1972. This suggests that the Watergate fiasco has dramatically altered voting practices and, more importantly, the vital trust needed for a president to successfully initiate his intended programs. Further damage can be found in the fact that every single president post-Nixon (save Ford) has campaigned on a platform of being an ‘outsider’ to Washington politics. By maintaining immunity to the perceived corruption inherent in Washington, presidential-hopefuls have tapped into a damaging seam. The structural components of American federalism rely on an experienced and powerful President to initiate both domestic and foreign proposals. Ignorance of the Congressional and Senatorial system is in fact not a blessing but a burden: without an intimate knowledge of Washington politics a president is semi-impotent. In addition, concentrated efforts by Congress to reign in presidential power have further limited the productive gains a president can enforce.

Oliver Stone’s 1995 film, Nixon, was attacked by Nixon apologists for its depiction of the president’s personal qualities: specifically, his penchant for alcohol; his mental instability; and the Freudian allusions to his mother. What Nixon loyalists failed to detect was that Stone was quite clearly in their camp. The general impression of the film is clearly within the traditional interpretation of the ‘politics-as-usual’ strain: Stone consistently negates every immoral or illegal act with the argument that Nixon was a brilliant foreign affairs specialist who was destroyed by his own paranoia and the hypocritical ethics of the media. In regards to foreign affairs alone, Nixon failed spectacularly:

“The final reckoning is that Nixon and Kissinger failed to reach their major foreign policy goals. They did not extract the United States from Vietnam without losing Vietnam to the Communists; they could not solve the problem of Formosa and thus establish full diplomatic relations with the Chinese; they could not establish a lasting détente; they did not put any controls on the arms race; they did not bring peace to the Middle East. Judged by their own standards, they came up short” (Ambrose; 1971; p. 270).

In addition, Christopher Hitchens latest work, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, argues that Nixon and his National Security Adviser were guilty of a number of international war crimes which wilfully ignored the basic principles of the Geneva Convention. A thorough investigation of Nixon’s foreign policy misdeeds will continue to have an impact on how Americans view their president’s role while further displacing Nixon’s credibility in this field. Had Nixon not stolen the 1968 election, however, any attacks on his Presidency are cursory.

This thesis has argued that Richard Nixon’s involvement in the 1968 peace talks forms the most damning indictment of his enduringly destructive legacy on American politics. His decision to impinge on a diplomatic negotiation which could have saved 50, 000 American and approximately 600,000 (combined) Vietnamese lives for the sake of winning an election was completely malevolent in nature and deed. The roots of this act have their origin in Nixon’s early political career, where he employed ruthless and illegal tactics to gain office. Nixon’s inability to deal with defeat became manifest in the 1960 presidential and 1962 gubernatorial campaigns, from which came the defence that the ‘liberal establishment’ and the media were on a mission to destroy him: ultimately, this led to the fatal decision to steal the 1968 election. The acts of illegality which marred Nixon’s pre-1968 campaign in themselves set precedents which are still evident in contemporary American politics. Corruption, media manipulation and a disdain for the electorate were evident as recently as the 2000 presidential election, where George Bush and Albert Gore decided to circumvent the Supreme Court in favour of local courts to decide the outcome of that election. Once in the White House, Nixon displayed how presidential power can be abused: both in his ostentatious perception of a presidency and the ordered break-in of the Brookings Institution.

The most worrying factor, however, to emerge from a study of Richard Nixon is his inability to tell right from wrong: a basic requirement for alleging temporary insanity in a criminal law court. Nixon’s memoirs, White House tapes and biographies make no display of contrition regarding any of the several illegal methods he employed either to gain or remain in office. One suggestion to avoid repeating a Nixon presidency is articulated by Milton Plessur: “Candidates might be required to have a health check up, and findings likely to affect their performance be made public…the public could then better judge whether a man’s health problems prior to his assuming office would be of any consequence while he is in office” (Tugwell and Cronin; 1974; p. 202).

Richard Nixon’s political legacy continues to have a significant impact on American politics. He provided incontrovertible evidence that the Constitution and American federalism can be abused to an individuals own end. In doing so, it is clear that drastic measures must be imposed to ensure electoral and presidential responsibility in the future. The setting up of a Presidential Supervisory Committee, under the auspices of a non-partisan Congressional body, could help to regulate presidential campaigns and oversee that the separation of powers is adhered to the highest possible standards. In the final analysis, the American electorate must come to terms with Richard Nixon’s ‘entire life’, in an effort to reverse voter apathy and renew the trust in their beloved Constitution.

Bibliography

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[1] Accounts vary enormously. Nixon painted a desolate and harsh upbringing during most of his life, yet at times admitted ‘we always had enough to eat’ (Summers; 2000; p. 6). The Nixon’s were certainly not destitute, yet they were not exactly ‘comfortable.’ A fair judgment would put their relative economic standard in Yorba Linda-where most were extremely poor-at the middle-income bracket.

[2] In 1946 terms.

[3] It is difficult to estimate exactly how much money was spent. Nevertheless, the approximate sums were an astronomical amount for that time.

[4] Douglas’s husband had been born Hesselberg. His father had been Jewish.

[5] From Kurz; 1998; p. 128.

[6] Checkers had been a gift from a campaign donator. Nixon claimed that the dog was the only plausible root of improper conduct involved in the entire scandal.

[7] After having been informed he would stay on as Eisenhower’s running mate.

[8] Doctors who treated the Vice-President had warned there was a possibility that the infection would lead to the amputation of his leg.

[9] Kennedy also wanted to make absolutely sure that Nixon would not contest the results of the election.

[10] Widow of the famous Second World War ace pilot Claire Chennault, Mrs. Anna Chennault was in 1968 vice-chairman of the Republican National Finance Committee and co-chairman of the Women for Nixon-Agnew.

[11] Most recently in a BBC documentary, The Secret World of Richard Nixon (2000), Chennault stated ‘my boss was Richard Nixon.’

[12] In 1968 Jack Dreyfus, a Nixon contributor, suggested he try Dilantin to counter depression. Dilantin is an anti-epileptic drug not designed to alleviate the symptoms of depression. If mixed with alcohol, the drug can produce serious side effects such as disorientation, mental confusion and slurred speech. In addition to taking un-prescribed doses of Dilantin-Dreyfus gave the president ‘several’ bottles of the drug, each containing 1000 tablets- Nixon was ingesting large doses of sleeping pills.

[13] Men employed by Charles Colson attempted on several occasions to gain access to the Brookings vault but each was unsuccessful.

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A legacy of “neopatrimonialism,” epitomized in the reign of Rafael Trujillo, has been one of the largest obstacles for Dominicans in search of democratization. According to Jonathan Hartlyn, “neopatrimonialism possesses two key characteristics: the centralization of power in the hands of the ruler who seeks to reduce the autonomy of his followers by generating ties of loyalty and dependence, commonly through complex patron-client linkages; and, in the process, the blurring of public and private interests and purposes within the administration.” Even after the assassination of the brutal dictator it was difficult for Dominicans to make a smooth transition to democracy and even more difficult for them to consolidate that democracy into an effective system. In the period after Trujillo’s death, there were two attempts to make the transition into a democratic government – the first can be viewed as a failure, and the second as a missed opportunity. Rafael Trujillo’s neopatrimonial, or “neosultanistic” rule, how it directly and indirectly inhibited the consolidation of democracy in the Dominican Republic, and the lingering legacy of his regime will all be examined in this essay. Also to be considered is the rule of the United States in the Dominican struggle for democratic politics. This essay will be divided into three sections: the first section will discuss the period of neosultanistic rule under Trujillo’s, the second sections will examine the first attempted transition to democracy (from Trujillo’s assassination to the authoritarian regime of Joaquín Balaguer), and the third section will look at the second attempted transition (from the election of Antonio Guzman until the reelection of Balaguer).

The Trujillo Era

In November 1916, under President Woodrow Wilson, United States troops occupied the Dominican Republic with mixed and vague motives and the desire of President Wilson to bring “‘good government’ to the Latin American peoples.” Under American occupation, education, heath, transportation and communication services were improved in a U.S. attempt to stabilize the nation through reforms. Although the U.S. intervention had numerous results and effects on Dominican society, the most notable and most relevant was the establishment of the Guardia Nacional Dominicana, which Wilson intended to be a depoliticized force to provide support for a constitutional government. In the 1920′s, the United States foreign policy concerning the Dominican Republic quickly shifted from military occupation to noninterventionism. The combination of these U.S. actions, though unintentional, set the stage for a thirty-year long brutal dictatorship.

Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina, born in 1891 in the town of San Cristóbal, quickly emerged as the head of the newly formed constabulary force and soon after as President of the Dominican Republic. Although a preexisting pattern of neopatrimonial rule, established under the country’s former caudillo rulers – Ulises Heureaux and Horacio Vásquez – facilitated Trujillo’s rise to power, several other factors proved equally vital to his success. The “institutional and structural changes as a result of U.S. occupation” contributed to Trujillo’s consolidation of power through the establishment of the Guardia Nacional Dominicana – which ultimately became Trujillo’s private army. The subsequent period of U.S. nonintervention furthermore assisted Trujillo in his rise to power by allowing him to take office through questionable elections – wining with “more votes than there were eligible voters.” As noted by Hartlyn “a stronger military and improved communications and infrastructure in a country that was will relatively poor, unintegrated, and isolated meant that Trujillo had the means to put down potential regional rebellions without necessarily having to incorporate and control the entire country’s population.”

Trujillo quickly transformed from a traditional caudillo dictator into a ruthless neosultanistic ruler – exercising power without restraint. In his first term as president, Trujillo created the Partido Dominicano (PD) – the only party allowed to function until 1947 – consolidating the government’s decision-making powers into his own hands. Also revealed within his first term in office was his limitless greed and megalomania – Trujillo changed the name of the capital city from Santo Domingo to Ciudad Trujillo, and eventually the generalissimo, his family and friends owned over half of the countries economic assets. Trujillo’s intolerable cruelty became undisputable when between October 2 and October 8, 1937 his army massacred between 20,000 and 50,000 Haitian illegal immigrants on his command. As a result of international criticism towards his slaughter, Trujillo allowed his vice-president, Jacinto Peynado, to be elected president in 1938. Trujillo strategically cooperated with the United States war effort in World War II and, as a result, received U.S. support in his campaign to be reelected. In 1942, Trujillo was once again reelected for another five-year term.

As a wave of democratization swept the world after World War II, Trujillo felt the pressure and liberalized accordingly. He allowed communist exiles to return to the Dominican Republic and in the 1947 elections he allowed two “regime-sponsored” opposition parties to run. However, a subsequent wave of repression destroyed both the communists and any other individuals not in favor of Trujillo. In 1952 and 1957, Trujillo had his brother, Héctor Trujillo, formally elected president while Trujillo continued to hold the power. As the Cold War mounted, Trujillo declared himself “the hemisphere’s foremost anticommunist.” The United States remained a staunch anticommunist ally of the Trujillo regime until Trujillo’s 1956 kidnapping and murdering of a very vocal opponent – Spaniard Jesús María de Galíndez in New York. By 1960, the hemisphere’s nations expressed extreme concern over the brutality of the Trujillo regime and in May 1961, Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominicans using guns supplied by the U.S. CIA.

When discussing the reign of Rafael Trujillo, it is important to look at the reasons why he was able to keep such strong control over the people and politics of the Dominican Republic for a period of thirty years. There are four primary factors contributing to his stronghold. The first is the historical legacy of neopatrimonial rule, the country’s weak and divided social forces and political actors, and a fractured economy. The second factor includes his use of repression, especially through the military, to psychologically control his people. He used phone tapping, spies, target assassinations, and censorship to manipulate and scare the Dominican citizenry. Trujillo used the armed forces as “his personal instrument rather than a national institution” and accordingly increased its size from about 2,000 to nearly 31,000 during his reign. The levels of corruption and the extent of Trujillo’s influence in the army are reflected in the fact that Trujillo’s eldest son, Ramfis, was made a full colonel at the age of four and a brigadier general by the age of nine.

It is also essential to note that Trujillo did have a relatively broad ideological base of support rooted in his economic nationalism, support for the Catholic Church, and anti-Haitianism. Although also a means of justifying his vast financial holdings, his ideological arguments gave him credit for the restoration of the nation’s financial sovereignty, while neglecting the negative effects of this selfish economic policies. The Catholic Church was one of Trujillo’s most loyal supporters and vice-versa. Trujillo’s improvement of religious education and subsidizing of the building of churches were just a few of the many prerogatives given to the Catholic Church in the Trujillo era. It was not until 1960 that the Church undoubtedly broke its ties with Trujillo.

The last factor contributing to Trujillo’s iron grip on every aspect of Dominican life is the role of the United States. U.S. leniency towards the Trujillo regime, especially during the Cold War years when Trujillo exaggerated his position against communism to appease the U.S., gave the dictator a great amount of freedom to oppress the Dominican people while continuing to receive monetary and military support from the United States. Trujillo continued to receive this support until the U.S. change of attitude towards the regime, primarily caused by the Cuban Revolution.

In the late 1950′s and early 1960′s, Trujillo’s regime began to receive a great deal of criticism both domestically and internationally. A growing number of Dominican elite (often humiliated by Trujillo), the Catholic Church (unable to continue supporting Trujillo’s repressive actions), and numerous Dominican political exiles (predominantly communist) all emerged as the active opposition. In June 1960, the Inter-American Peace Committee of the Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the Dominican Republic for human rights violations. Trujillo desperately, and ultimately unsuccessfully, turned to the Soviet Union for help. Economic sanctions were placed on his regime by the OAS that led to a major economic crisis. Trujillo’s problems continued to haunt him until he was assassinated on May 3, 1961, as he was being driven to visit his mistress.

In summary, the Trujillo regime was neosultanistic in that it exercised power without restraint in a corrupt and ruthless government, and loyalty to him was based on a combination of fear and rewards. Trujillo accrued extensive and unmatched wealth and power in the Dominican Republic through his limitless greed. When Trujillo was assassinated in 1961, the Dominican Republic struggled for democratization, but the transition from dictatorship to democracy, though initially successful, ultimately failed.

Failed Transition I: Struggles and Failures

After the Trujillo assassination, the United States made extensive efforts and played a pivotal role in removing the Trujillo family from power and allowing the opposition to come out. Joaquín Balaguer, a friend of Trujillo’s, emerged as President of the Dominican Republic after the assassination of the dictator. Fearing that a complete breakdown of the Dominican government would allow communism to manifest, the United States opted to work with Balaguer in an attempt to liberalize the nation. As Dominican citizens ripped down statues of Trujillo and attacked all other symbols of his tyrannical dictatorship, Balaguer began to face mounting domestic opposition – especially from the formally exiled Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) – until an attempted coup forced him into exile. In 1962, an anti-Trujillista council of state was formed, and as the provisional government it organized the democratic elections held at the end of that year. The strongly U.S.-backed provisional government expected to win the elections with ease; however, they failed to recognize the power of the PRD.

A party founded in Cuba by political exile Juan Bosch in 1939, the PRD “made a conscious effort to organize a peasant organization, the Federación Nacional de Hermandades Campesinas.” Aware that the Dominican population remained vastly rural, Bosch shifted the focus of the campaign from the struggle against Trujilloism to the problems of the poor. When asked if he still intended to run despite allegations that he was a communist, Bosch’s answer foreshadowed (extremely accurately) the events that were to follow the election: “I do not wish to be a candidate because I know that the PRD will win the elections, and if it does, the government I head will not be able to rule. It will be overthrown in a short time on the pretext that it is communist.” Although Bosch did run, and decisively won the elections, his concerns did materialize.

With extensive assistance from the United States, democratic elections were finally held in the Dominican Republic. While the U.S. desperately wanted a democratically elected Dominican government to prosper, Dominicans themselves lacked the commitment to democracy – a result of the insecurities that formed in the people under the Trujillo regime. Industrialists, landowning elites and the Catholic Church were among the most vocal opponents of Bosch – particularly due to his new constitution that had a “more secular tone and more expansive view of civil rights and state expropriation of private property.” Also a threat to the elites was a proposed law that would allow the government to confiscate any enterprises gained by “illicit enrichment,” which meant almost every enterprise established during the Trujillo era. The discontented business element of the nation formed the Acción Dominicana Independiente (ADI) and openly opposed Bosch. Although the United States wanted a democratically elected government to succeed in the Dominican Republic, it soon became obvious that its fear of communism took precedence.

With the communist revolution of Cuba fresh in the minds of Americans, an ensuing Haitian revolution, and an influx of Cuban refugees in to Dominican territory, it was easy for U.S. politicians to express their concern of a similar communist revolution in the Dominican Republic. Even though some of the aforementioned opposition groups did hold a genuine fear of communist takeover in the Dominican Republic, this U.S. paranoia quickly transformed into a tool used by Bosch’s domestic opposition to perpetuate this U.S. concern. The United States did not do all that it could to support Bosch’s presidency, however, even more concerning is the fact that Bosch himself did little to defend himself and fight his opposition.

Despite the fact that the opposition to Bosch was vast, the president did not mobilize his party or his supporters in an attempt to fight back. This can be explained partly by his dwindling support from the peasantry due to his inability to carry through the reforms he promised in his campaign. Also a factor was Bosch’s personality and political strategy – a man who believed in fatalism, Bosch allowed his presidency to be overthrown believing it was destiny. The democratic president also discouraged the PRD from fighting a resistance campaign, believing that it would end in bloodshed. Bosch was deposed on September 25, 1963, proving that democracy could not survive in the country’s social context in the immediate post-Trujillo years.

After Bosch’s downfall, a triumvirate, with businessman Donald Reid Cabral as leader, emerged as the new governing force. Although backed by the U.S., the Reid government quickly became authoritarian and faced a great deal of resistance among the Dominican people. In April of 1965, a popular uprising to bring Bosch back into power led to yet another U.S. military intervention. President Lyndon B. Johnson, determined to prevent another socialist revolution in the region, decided to “defuse the Dominican crisis.” In a recreation of the 1962 elections, the U.S. sponsored a provisional government under President Héctor García Godoy, and planned elections for June 1966. After returning from exile, Bosch and Balaguer became the two primary candidates. Bosch, discouraged by the feeling of U.S. betrayal, once again left all to fate and did little to promote himself in his campaign. Taking advantage of Bosch’s lackluster campaign, Balaguer rallied the spirit of his fellow Dominicans by promising stability. Balaguer won the election by an overwhelming majority, beginning his twelve-year-long neopatrimonial rule after which a weak and unstable, yet democratic government was to emerge.

Failed Transition II: A “Missed Opportunity”

After the 1966 election of Balaguer, the PRD went through a phase of internal division that ultimately led to Juan Bosch, the founder of the party, leaving the PRD in 1973. Bosch, convinced that democratic politics could not survive in the Dominican Republic, urged the PRD to practice “electoral abstention.” As the leftist elements of the PRD increasingly supported the idea of a revolutionary coup, and the moderate elements rejected Bosch’s abstention theory, Bosch purged the party of the extremist elements and began restructuring the party in order to fulfill his personal goals. José Francisco Peña Gómez, secretary general of the PRD, along with other PRD moderates expressed the need for the party to strengthen its ties with liberal U.S. politicians if it wanted to change Dominican politics. In November of 1973, Juan Bosch broke with the PRD and formed the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD), a very small and radical party that served as a forum for Bosch to express his hopes for national liberation. This split in the PRD caused uncertainties that led to the party’s abstention which, in turn, allowed Balaguer to be reelected.

After all of these frustrations, the PRD, under the leadership of Peña Gómez, went to extensive lengths to fortify the party’s international ties. In a 1977 party convention, Antonio Guzmán was chosen to run as the PRD candidate in the 1978 elections. The PRD, with the motto “Change Without Violence,” was finally united and ready for the 1978 elections with Guzmán as the presidential candidate, Jacobo Majluta as the vice-presidential candidate, and Salvador Jorge Blanco as party president. With intensifying U.S. pressure to hold honest elections, Balaguer allowed the PRD to speak freely on the radio and legalized the Communist Party – an attempt to take votes away from the PRD. As economic deterioration formed a class of disgruntled businessmen, and fractionalization plagued Balaguer’s PR party, the PRD was executing an internationally recognized and well funded campaign. After a PRD victory, a period of tension, uncertainly and instability ensued – an attempted coup was foiled, Balaguer accused the PRD of massive electoral fraud, Juan Bosch spoke out against the PRD, and calls for the respect of the results of a democratic election became an issue of international (particularly U.S.) focus. Despite these strains, the transition to a democratic regime was peaceful and initially successful.

The conditions in 1978 were much more favorable for a democratic transition than they were in 1962. The nature of Balaguer’s regime, although reminiscent of Trujillo’s, was much more conducive to subsequent democratization efforts. The lack of any major national security threats in the Dominican Republic allowed the United States to focus more on the issue of democracy and human rights rather than communism or military occupation. Although democratization seemed to be within reach, the period of PRD rule after the 1978 elections proved to be a “missed opportunity” in the Dominican struggle for democratic politics.

At the time of the PRD election, there were many factors that were ultimately impeding the Guzmán and Jorge Blanco administrations from completely breaking away from the traditional neopatrimonial patterns of Dominican politics. The PRD, specifically Guzmán, was able to tackle their most threatening problem – the traditionally influential and highly politicized armed forces. In an attempt to constrain Guzmán, prior to his departure from office Balaguer passed a law prohibiting civilian authorities from removing officers from a military position before two years passed. After implementing this law, Balaguer placed some of his closest military friends in top-ranking positions and Guzmán was legally prohibited from removing them. On his inauguration day, Guzmán encouraged by the presence of international dignitaries, boldly reshuffled Balaguer’s military appointments – a blatant violation of the newly implemented law that, in combination with other changes, finally led to the deterioration of the military as a direct threat to democracy. The notoriously frail national economy did not, however, cease to be a ruinous institution to the democratic struggle.

The PRD governed the Dominican Republic in a period of extreme economic decline that was worsened by international factors and a serious of poor domestic decisions. The Guzmán administration largely increased public spending and began taking out a great deal of loans from international banks to support an export-oriented economy. The Dominican economy, despite a relatively promising start with the election of Guzmán, was quickly bombarded with problems. In August 1979, the small island nation was swept with two of the worst hurricanes in Caribbean history, causing over $800 million in damage and taking the lives of over 1000 Dominicans. The refusal to negotiate a stabilization program with the IMF combined with the unlimited capacity for foreign debt and meager economic assistance from the United States, the Guzmán administration experienced extremely rapid debt expansion – setting the stage for a harsh stabilization program under the Jorge Blanco administration.

Realizing that a stabilization process was necessary, Jorge Blanco and his economic team quickly began negotiations with the IMF. As inflation (caused by the devaluation of the Dominican peso) went through the roof, government spending increased, and U.S. financial support decreased, the Dominican government was unable to meet the terms of their agreement with the IMF. The IMF, in turn, suspended further funds to the Dominican Republic forcing Jorge Blanco to implement further stabilization measures. In April 1984, as a result of these measures (primarily the increase in prices of food items due to de facto devaluation of the peso), a violent popular uprising erupted, causing the deaths of over 100 Dominican civilians. The riots led to the suspension of talks with the IMF, which in turn led to the suspension of economic assistance from the United States. Jorge Blanco, aware of the importance of the IMF in Dominican economic recovery, imposed a tight monetary policy; more carefully controlled the public-sector expenditures; and unified the country’s exchange rate. Despite the immediate recessionary effects of these policies, the Jorge Blanco administration was able to revive its negotiations with the IMF and eventually stabilize the economy. It was not, however, the administration’s economic troubles that lead to its downfall, but rather a schism within the PRD.

The fact that Jorge Blanco had a party majority in the senate and the chamber did not prove to be advantageous as he faced congressional opposition similar to that of Guzmán (Guzmán did not, however, have a party majority in either senate or chamber). This opposition came from within the PRD, primarily from Jacobo Majluta, former vice-president under Guzmán, whose own political ambitions led him to create a separate movement within the PRD in opposition to Jorge Blanco. By blocking almost all of Jorge Blanco’s tax legislations, international loans, and other economic, social and political measure taken to the senate, Majluta looked to tarnish the image of Jorge Blanco in order to promote his own presidential candidacy in the 1986 elections. This inability to enact reforms through the senate combined with the deteriorating economic conditions forced Jorge Blanco to revert to the neopatrimonial politics so well known to Dominican government.

Unable to bring his inaugural promises to realization, Jorge Blanco was said to have “lost control of himself” in the final months of his presidency, using his presidential powers to grant import and tax exemptions to his business associates. Inheriting a severely damaged economy and social structure from the Balaguer regime, and facing restricting conditions in the senate and chamber, the shortcomings of the Jorge Blanco administration cannot be blamed entirely on the president. Jorge Blanco, perhaps the nation’s best hope for democratization, faced a presidency so inundated with crippling problems that he was forced to return to the neopatrimonial practices so deeply entrenched in Dominican politics. Therefore, the two terms in which the PRD was in power should be regarded as a “missed opportunity,” rather than an outright failure, to change the nation’s neopatrimonial political patterns.

It is irrefutable that the thirty-year long dictatorial rule of Rafael Trujillo has had lasting effects on the nature of Dominican politics. Even after the assassination of the brutal dictator, the Dominican Republic was not liberated from his neopatrimonial rule, which was to be reflected in even the most democratic and liberal Dominican administrations. Despite extensive efforts from the United States, Dominican governments fail to consolidate democratic politics, as is demonstrated by the overthrow of Juan Bosch, and the reelection of Joaquín Balaguer after a brief period of PRD rule. As the legacy of neopatrimonial politics continues to exist in the Dominican Republic, so does the genuine struggle for democratic politics and as long as this struggle exists, so does hope.

Bibliography

Black, Jan Knippers. The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986.

Chang-Rodriguez, Eugenio, ed. The Lingering Crisis: A Case Study of the Dominican Republic. New York: Las Americas Publishing Company, 1969.

Hartlyn, Jonathan. The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1998.

Moya Pons, Frank. The Dominican Republic: A National History. New York: Hispaniola Books, 1995.

Sagas, Ernesto and Orlando Inoa, eds. The Dominican People: A Documentary History. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2003.

Turtis, Richard Lee. Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime and Modernity in Dominican History. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

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A thorough examination of Alito’s record depicts him as a conservative-leaning judge who believes in judicial restraint. For the very contentious issue of abortion, Alito appears at first to be a firm anti-abortionist. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1991), Alito dissented. He believed that a Pennsylvania law requiring wives to tell their husbands before receiving an abortion did not create an “undue burden” for mothers. He provided a few exceptions to this rule; namely, the father cannot be located, her husband is not the father, the pregnancy was a result of a reported sexual assault, or the notification would lead to physical violence against the woman. In another court case, Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, Alito struck down a law regarding intact dilation and extraction or “partial birth abortions.” Supporters of Alito cite this case as evidence of less extreme conservative views and a steadfast adherence to precedent set by the Supreme Court. A nearly identical case in Nebraska by the Supreme Court struck down a similar law, so Alito responded by obeying the highest court.

For the issue of the separation of church and state, Alito ruled to uphold the display of religious and secular symbols at city hall. In ACLU v. New Jersey, Alito decided that the display did not violate the Establishment Clause. He noted that the Supreme Court precedents are vague as to what is allowed and what is not. He wrote that due to these ambiguities, “Under these circumstances, the mere fact that city officials miscalculate and approve a display that is found by the federal courts to cross over the line is hardly proof of the officials’ bad faith.” He concluded that the lawsuit against the city should be dropped. The case also followed the Supreme Court precedent of County of Allegheny v. ACLU where the court ruled that religious symbols like a Menorah are allowed if these displays also include secular symbols.

Alito ruled in Chittister v. Department of Community and Economic Development (2004) that the Family Medical Leave Act supercedes Congress’ power. The Act required employers to give employees time off for childbirth or health conditions. Alito disagreed with the Act writing, “Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which the FMLA is said to enforce, the FMLA does much more than require nondiscriminatory sick leave practices; it creates a substantive entitlement to sick leave.” Critics have argued that this case demonstrates Alito’s restriction of workers’ rights while supporters have argued that it indicates Alito’s preference for a smaller national government and Alito’s aversion to broad interpretations of the constitution.

In the case Doe v. Groody (2004) Alito dissented with a majority in a ruling about unreasonable search and seizures. The police were executing a standard search when they strip searched a mother and her 10 year old daughter, which was not covered within the warrant. Alito believed that reasonable police officers would interpret the warrant to include such a search, especially considering that drug dealers frequently hide contraband on young children during police raids. He writes, “The majority notes that this passage does not literally state that narcotics dealers often hide drugs on family members and young children, but this is precisely the sort of technical, legalistic reading that is out of place in interpreting a search warrant or supporting affidavit.” In this case Alito takes a practical stance on crime-fighting. He argues that the search should be valid considering it combats the hiding of contraband. His critics argue that this search comes at the cost of the rights of suspected criminals.

In Saxe v. State College Area School District (1999), Alito struck down a public school district’s anti-harassment policy. Alito wrote that free speech should cover offensive speech as well, including “statements that impugn another’s race or national origin or that denigrate religious beliefs.” Shore Regional High School Board of Education v. P.S. deals with the case of a student who transferred to a different school due to Shore Regional not protecting him from a habitual bully. Alito ruled with a unanimous court that allowed such a transfer since the school had not made accommodations for the students under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The issues and rulings in these cases regarding strict free speech and disability rights seem to not fit the profile of modern conservatism.

Perhaps Alito’s most controversial ruling, U.S. v. Rybar, deals with machine guns. Raymond Rybar, Jr. was convicted on two counts for violating a law making it “unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun.” The court struck down his challenge that claimed the law was beyond Congress’ commerce power and violated the Second Amendment. In Alito’s dissent, he shifts the debate from gun rights to federalism. He cites the precedent of U.S. v. Lopez and votes to overturn the law since, “Congress made no findings regarding the link between the intrastate activity regulated by these laws and interstate commerce.” His ruling was unpopular among other judges and is quite distressing to gun control activists. The ruling should figure prominently in his confirmation hearings.

Alito’s record reveals a judicial philosophy that is much more complex than many would claim. He ruled in favor of free speech protections in Saxe v. State College Area School District and he ruled in favor of broad applications of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. However, his decisions on gun control, search and seizures, abortion, and religious reveal a definite conservative slant. The rulings indicate less of a conservative political ideology like Justice Scalia but more of a conservative judicial philosophy of judicial restraint and strict constructionism like Judge Rehnquist. The best example of this is in his ruling in Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer where he struck down a partial birth abortion ban in deference to the Supreme Court. Certainly he agreed with the law, but he had to vote against it due to precedent.

Judicial philosophies are historically notoriously difficult to determine before a Justice actually begins to hear cases. Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren and later remarked that it was “the biggest damned fool mistake I’ve ever made in my life.” Likewise, Presidents Richard Nixon and George Bush Sr. would certainly like to rethink their appointments of Harry Blackmun, the majority opinion writer of Roe v. Wade, and David Souter, a dissenter in Bush v. Gore (2000). Arguably, the framing of a candidate by his opposition is just as important as the record to his judicial confirmation. There exists a process of myth-making by the opposition. The critics of a candidate choose a negative theme to highlight about the figure. Oftentimes, this theme is personal. Politics are certainly not absent from the judicial process.

The myth-making process is most obvious in the past four failed nominees for the Supreme Court. In 1970 Richard Nixon appointed Harold Carswell to replace the liberal-leaning Abe Fortas. The Carswell nomination was marred with many problems; the candidate had praised White supremacy early in his career and 58% of his decisions were overturned. His detractors cast Carswell as a mediocre man, unsuited for a position on the venerable court. The framing of the candidate as a mediocre intellect worked so well that even his supporters appeared to agree with the sentiment. Republican Senator Roman Hruska famously remarked, “Even if he is mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they?” The nomination was rejected 51-45.

In 1987 President Reagan nominated legal scholar Robert Bork to the court. His nomination was blindsided by a comment by Senator Edward Kennedy made only 45 minutes after the announcement of the nomination. Kennedy said, “Robert Bork’s America is a land in which women would be forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down citizens’ doors in midnight raids, children could not be taught about evolution.” The comments depicted Bork as an arch-conservative whose opinions are clearly outside of the mainstream. His nomination failed by a vote of 58-42. The Bork nomination is the most apparent example of the importance of myth-making in opposing a candidate. Immediately after Bork, Reagan nominated Douglas H. Ginsburg. Investigations revealed that Ginsburg used marijuana. Critics painted him as a hypocrite, especially considering these allegations were disclosed at the height of Reagan’s War against Drugs. Amidst all the controversy, Ginsburg withdrew his name.

The most recent example of myth-making is the nomination of Harriet Miers. This nominee is unique in that her harshest criticism came from her own party. While the Democrats questioned the appointment as an act of cronyism, right-wing Republicans attacked her as unqualified and intellectually incapable. William Kristol wrote in a Weekly Standard editorial, “I’m disappointed because I expected President Bush to nominate someone with a visible and distinguished track record…[Miers] has no constitutionalist credentials that I know of…I’m demoralized, surely this is a pick from weakness.” George Will less subtly editorialized in The Washington Post, “There is no evidence that she is among the leading lights of American jurisprudence, or that she possesses talents commensurate with the Supreme Court’s tasks.” The Miers nomination was met with opposition from both sides. They labeled her as an unqualified political crony. In order to avoid a contentious nomination battle, Miers withdrew her name from consideration.

The process of negative myth-making has appeared to avoid the Alito nomination so far. Elliot Mineberg of the People for the American Way believes, “[Alito's] record that is not just conservative, but we would consider it out of the mainstream of conservatism.” This criticism has not picked up steam among more mainstream liberal media outlets. The New York Times ran a story entitled, “Alito is seen as a Methodical Jurist with a Clear Record.” The story’s mostly laudatory contents could hardly be considered an expose into his record. The nomination seems like it will avoid the pitfalls of negative myth-making that befell the Carswell, Bork, Ginsburg, and Miers nominations.

On the ideological side, Alito appears conservative but not as extremely conservative as Scalia and Thomas. The nomination will be opposed by many Democrats but it seems safe from a filibuster. Alito is not conservative enough to warrant a filibuster from the Democrats. If they opt to filibuster, I doubt that the rest of the country would support the move. President Bush has expertly chosen the perfect candidate in this respect. Alito is unabashedly conservative, yet his record reveals he is more judicially conservative than politically conservative. His views occupy the perfect place on the political spectrum. If he were any more conservative, a filibuster would have to occur which would halt the rest of Bush’s agenda. If Alito were any less conservative, the right-wing of his party would revolt in a similar fashion as the Miers nomination. In addition to Alito’s record, he has impeccable credentials that free him from any attack like the criticisms against Carswell, Bork, Ginsburg, and Miers. Complaints of mediocrity, reactionary opinions, drug use, or a lack of experience do not fit here. The confluence of Alito’s judicial philosophy and the lack of material for a personal attack by opponents bode well for the fate of the nomination.

Works Cited

Kristol, William. “Disappointed, Depressed, and Demoralized.” Weekly Standard, 3 October 2005.

Lewis, Neil A. and Scott Shane. “Alito is seen as a Methodical Jurist with a Clear Record.” The New York Times, 1 Nov 2005.

Reinart, Patty. “Battle Begins over Alito Record.” Houston Chronicle, 2 Nov 2005.

“Robert Bork.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Bork.

Will, George. “Can This Nomination Be Justified?” The Washington Post, 5 Nov 2005.

U.S. v. Rybar. Available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/user/wbardwel/public/nfalist/us_v_rybar.txt

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After reading several articles and looking up various facts and statistics, I have found a ton of interesting information about the system and how it works. Drug companies make pills for diseases they have completely made up, and conduct phony clinical tests. They put billions of dollars into consumer advertising, and even more, $10,000 per doctor, into getting our physician to sell their product. They bribe doctors into conducting phony research and prescribing as much of these medications as they can.

They can afford it too, they are a half trillion-dollar industry, making more than every single gas station in the U.S. combined. They also overprice the medication, so that us American consumers will have to pay more for it that we actually could be. This is where our government comes into play. Our president has blocked all prescription imports from any country, and made it only possible to purchase prescriptions from the monopoly-controlled United States pharmacies. Our president has also announced that he wants to have every child and adult in America take a mental health screening, more than likely so that many of us will be prescribed anti-psychotic and anti-depressive medication.

Maybe we should be learning more about the side effects of these harmful drugs before everyone in America is on them. We are a terrorist concerned country, but what we don’t know is that prescription pills kill 16,400% more people than terrorist do. That’s 12 million people each year. It wouldn’t be quite so bad if they were at least honest about the pills they put out. It’s said that 94% of the information given out on commercials, and in brochures for our doctors to read so they will prescribe these pills, is false.

That is my view, and the information I have presented is true, but on the other hand a lot of people in our country have to deal with serious illnesses and do need medication. Without pharmaceutical companies every person in our country with an ailment or disease would be suffering. There is no doubt that these companies are needed to ensure the health and safety of our people and our economy. Without this huge industry our country would have a lot less money too. There is a pill out there for pretty much anyone who needs a cure for anything, other than AIDS and cancer of course. Many people with mood disorders also have a need for medication. The role that our doctors and psychiatrist’s play is a very important one. They are the ones who decide which medication to prescribe to which person and for what reason. We need these companies around to help many people in our country throughout their lives.

My main issue though, is that these people may be getting prescribed medication simply for the purpose of profit, and not because it will help them. If a doctor is getting paid by a certain company to promote a certain medication for depression, than he more than likely will prescribe that pill without thinking much about the patients symptoms and whether it is right for them, or thinking about the possible side effects that might occur while taking it.

It is the responsibility of the pharmaceutical companies to produce accurate information about their products and to do extensive research and testing to make sure, not only that it works, but also that it is safe, and they, sadly do not.

Bibliography

http://www.nida.nih.gov/

http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs5/5140/

http://www.newstarget.com/pharmaceutical_industry.html

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Immediately after the time period preceding the Showa Restoration, democracy had set foot in the Japanese turf promising the image of a nation being transformed to a country of full-fledged democracy. This picture, nevertheless, hid a huge abyss that was left to be filled as a direct result of the Taisho democracy towards the end of the 1920′s. There were three important circumstances at the beginning of the 1930′s that had shattered Japan’s democratic hopes, which had been in the first place from realistic. These factors were the downturn in the world economy, the shunning of Japanese immigrants in western countries, and the independence of Japan’s military.

The first circumstance, the downturn in the world economy, had wrecked disaster with Japan’s economy. The effects of World War I had permitted phenomenal industrial growth, but after the war ended, Japan had to compete with other Industrial Nations for economic dominance. This competition proved to be economically painful. The Japanese leadership was not used to such obstacles and thus proved to be slow to pass legislation and deal with its problems.

Another factor that contributed towards the Showa restoration was The Japanese Exclusion Act passed in 1924 by America to exclude Japanese immigrants. This affected the Japanese attitude that they were being viewed as inferior by Western Nations. This view was strengthened further as a series of mishaps at the meetings at Versailles, where it appeared to Japan that Europe was not willing to surrender its possessions in Asia. The Japanese legislation was not used to compromising in situations where it was being viewed weak and where negotiation acts seemed frivolous. Furthermore, the Japanese military had the conception that war with the west was inevitable and compromise was simply a waste of time and effort.

The third major circumstance was the independent Japanese military that utilized on the Taisho’s democratic efforts that had failed to halt the economic recession and submission of the Japanese government to the West. The Japanese military strenuously maintained that the parliamentarian government had capitulated to the west by making an unfavorable agreement about the size of the Japanese Navy (the Washington Conference and the Five Powers Treaty) and by reducing the size of the military.

Out of these three circumstances, the Japanese military seemed to sweep the nation’s attitude with efforts of regaining respect among western nations. The depression that struck Japan in 1929 especially favored the military’s movements and popularity. In particular, the military brutally accused government politicians for the failure to maintain the Meiji Restoration and called for a change in the country’s policy throughout the 1920′s. As the Japanese economy worsened, the military’s advocacy for a second revolutionary restoration, a “Showa Restoration” began getting popularity among people. International trade was at a standstill and countries resorted to nationalistic economic policies.

The young army officers and nationalist civilians closely identified with the “Imperial Way Faction.” This relative independence of the military from the parliament, transformed this sense of a national crisis into a total shift in foreign policy. Japanese nationalism overwhelmed Japan and the military continued to blame the parliamentarians for the economic despair and for surrendering to the western nations. It seemed that the parliamentary democracy of the Taisho and Meiji eras had been fully assumed by the independent military. Parliamentary control was weakening as the military controlled foreign policy. Japan’s political journey from its nearly democratic government of the 1920′s to its radical nationalism of the mid 1930′s, the collapse of democratic institutions, and the eventual military state was not an overnight transformation

In conclusion, the three main reasons that contributed to the failure of the Taisho democracy were economic instability, being shunned by western nations and the independent military. The military in particular had the better hand in the transformation of the country into the “Showa Restoration”. The military was well prepared in dealings with western nations and had a firm attitude on policies being passed by other nations that undermined Japan’s strengths.

Bibliography

• Tetsuo Najita. Japan The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980) 138
• Edwin O. Reischauer Japan Past and Present (Tokyo: Charles Tuttle Company, 1987) 171.
• Peter Duus. The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976) 156.
• Edwin O. Reischauer Japan Past and Present (Tokyo: Charles Tuttle Company, 1987) 171.
• Tetsuo Najita Japan The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980) 138.

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Sun-Tzu, Napolean Bonaparte, Winston Churchill and Dwight Eisenhower are but a few of the legendary military strategists who continue to fascinate the political and military leaders of tomorrow. Such leaders are notable not only for their numerous personal and historical successes, but also a concept integral to those successes: the identification and importance of achieving the balance between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power. Joseph Nye, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government and author of the recent work The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t go it Alone (2002), argues that America can no longer afford to rely on its well established military capacities and global presence in furthering the national interest. In a post cold war and post 9-11 environment, Nye believes, the United States can only successfully achieve its national interest by promulgating various cultural and economic factors unique to the United States.

In a testimony delivered recently to the U.S. Congress regarding public diplomacy programs, Ambassador David M. Abshire stated: ‘Our public diplomacy strategy must be recognized as equal in importance to our military and diplomatic strategies.’ This statement reveals the central thrust of this discussion: how can the current foreign policy of the United States – widely perceived as aggressive and unilateral – operate in relation to ‘public diplomacy’ efforts. In addition, that for public diplomacy initiatives to be successful, there must be a sustained consistency to the message being disseminated. This dichotomy is enlarged at the present time as the role of public diplomacy and its definitions, stature and value to the U.S. foreign policy apparatus are being re-evaluated.

Established at the request of Congress in 2003, the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World published their findings under the title Changing Minds, Winning Peace. Reporting directly to the House Appropriations Committee, they defined Public Diplomacy and its potential role as:

[Public diplomacy is] the promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging, and influencing people around the world. Public diplomacy helped win the Cold War, and it has the potential to help win the war on terror.

Many former practitioners and participants of the Cold War diplomatic establishment, specifically those working under the aegis of public diplomacy, relate with passionate regret the consolidation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the State Department. Former member of the U.S. Board for International Broadcasting, Barry Zorthian, explains:

The end of the Cold War revealed an ugly political truth. American public diplomacy was about our achievements in education, art, culture, social issues, and the finding of common political ground between diverse traditions. However, political support for public diplomacy, at least in the Congress, stopped at the end of the Cold War.

Public diplomacy, as a definition, was unavailable to foreign policy practitioners until the twentieth century. Without the technological and communications advances that accelerated after World War II, the machinery needed to promote public diplomacy would not exist. These were available in ample supply to the United States during the Cold War, and public diplomacy enjoyed an unlimited amount of success in projecting America’s national interest abroad.

Organs of the public diplomacy body during the cold war included options as diverse as the Voice of America to the CIA’s ‘phoenix’ program waged during the Vietnam War. While there is room to discuss these individual initiatives and their merits, it would be fair to concur with Zorthian’s assessment that public diplomacy played a significant role in helping America enjoy her current status as a superpower.

Along with the benefits of this hegemony, however, came the price of resentment. Disenfranchised nations across the globe, including the Middle East, came to look at America’s economic and social riches not as a viable goal for their own societies, but as an impetus for latent hostility to focus on a common enemy. For America, William Yeats’ The Second Coming held a resounding significance on September 11, 2001, when ‘mere anarchy was loosed upon the world.’

President Bush signaled a ‘revolution’ in U.S. foreign policy when he declared so vehemently: ‘Either you are with us. Or you are with the terrorists.’ The foreign policy focus of the United States – based ideologically within the latter’s narrow constraints – has been to create a ‘war on terrorism.’ This has resulted in a bizarre amalgamation of previously effective Cold War policies including ‘containment’; ‘rollback’; ‘realpolitik’; and ‘linkage.’ Under the rubric of this unlimited war on terrorism we have seen the creation of an ‘axis of evil’; the ‘pre-emptive’ strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq; and what Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay identify as America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy:

What precisely was the Bush revolution in foreign policy? At its broadest level, it rested on two beliefs. The first was that in a dangerous world the best – if not the only – way to ensure America’s security was to shed the constraints imposed by friends, allies, and international institutions…The second belief was that an America Unbound should use its strength to change the status quo in the world.

To the international community, the intentions of the United States seem clear. They have been demonstrated in the dismantling of long standing ties to key allies; an obvious contempt for the United Nations; and an aggressive global military campaign. Voices of dissent are met with the refutation: ‘…when America leads, few follow.’

Despite this worrying development in global politics, a voice of reason has emerged in the form of a reinvigorated definition of public diplomacy. Presently, massive efforts are being made to overhaul and implement U.S. foreign policy in a new direction. Initiatives begun at the highest levels from the Executive Branch have begun to permeate into basic, but ultimately effective, suggestions such as an improved demeanour and basic courtesy on the part of immigration officers. As Winston Churchill wisely stated when assessing Korean War negotiations: “To jaw-jaw is better than to war-war.”

This author witnessed first hand the developments in U.S. public diplomacy while involved in the Center for the Study of the Presidency’s (CSP) Communicating America project. This project aimed to assuage tensions between the Muslim world and America by attempting to identify universal links between those regions. CSP collaborated with a number of bodies to urge their awareness of public diplomacy goals and implement specific recommendations. The response – from Hollywood to the White House – was not only enthusiastic, but sincere. While the methods employed to go about this task were meticulous in their execution and intent, I was forced to question the legitimacy of the message being broadcast.

In the first instance, conveying a nations national identity is not as simple as selling a product. As Jarol Manheim states in Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy:

…even the most effective public relations effort is unlikely to possess the power to overcome substantial historical forces once they have been set in motion against the interests of the client.

The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed great achievements on the part

of the United States, but they also produced great injustices. For the Muslim world, this tension is harnessed in the Arab-Israeli conflict, where American support for Israel embodies Arab perceptions of America’s national interest. Simply informing an Egyptian or a Palestinian that Americans share their concerns will not actually aid in the process of healing long standing rifts, no matter in how elaborate a package the message is delivered. In addition, if nations have a collective consciousness, then the United States seems incapable of recognising that:

To perceive the deep cultural and psychological tendencies that make up a national character it helps to experience them oneself; but national character is so amorphous that it also helps to have an outsider’s perspective in order to see its distinctive shape.

If the United States is truly committed to promoting a better understanding of itself to the world then it must resist the temptation to simply find bigger and better means of communicating outwardly. Better radio and television communications are useful devices, yet smaller efforts, which allow sustained human contact, are as valuable. For instance, setting up the Office of Global Communications assists the executive Branch in censoring President Bush, yet without an appreciation of the consequences of communication, this office remains redundant. As many academics mentioned at CSP, combined efforts spanning years of time and effort can be undone when the President of the United States declares: ‘Ariel Sharon is a man of Peace.’

There is, then, something inherently ‘American’ about their approach to public diplomacy:

…[c]onsumer perceptions of car brands are very close to the brand images of the countries they come from: Italy: flamboyant, stylish but erratic; Sweden: safe but dull; or Germany: efficient but dull.

America is a consumerist society, a product of its historical infancy. Until an appreciation develops as to the meaning of the word communication, anti-Americanism will continue to plague their national consciousness. That is to say that ‘communication’ implies a two way street built on a genuine desire to understand other cultures and respond accordingly. In addition, and as the above quote implies, that even consumer perceptions of products necessitate an equal balance of good and bad interpretation. Anti-Americanism is not – as perceived – an indictment of who Americans are, but the consequence of some of their foreign policy actions. Until Anti-Americanism is understood by the American consciousness as a healthy by-product of communication, public diplomacy can only serve as a public relations exercise.

Better public diplomacy value can be found in volunteer service programs such as the Peace Corps, now a faded incarnation of John F. Kennedy’s legacy. Unfortunately, these rather unglamorous initiatives are the ones that can provide the most success. For example, take Seeds of Peace, a non-profit organization based in New York. That organization takes Arab and Israeli children out of the conflict zone and into an American summer camp. By doing so, it transplants future leaders from the negative aspects of their own socio-economic experiences and offers them a realistic vision of an ‘American’ experience. Furthermore, it does so at a time when they are impressionable and can carry those positive experiences back to share with others. Juxtaposed against a grand scheme to stifle the export of the show Baywatch to other cultures – as the entertainment industry is being urged to do so at the moment – organizations like Seeds of Peace promotelegitimacy.

The lesson of all this is clear – without legitimacy, the exercise of power alone can only get you so far. With legitimacy comes international support and assistance – and a cushion of good will when events go awry. Without legitimacy, you are on your own, making successes that much less likely. Legitimacy, in short, is not a luxury for the powerful and a necessity of the weak, as some argue – it is what is necessary to translate power into success.

Presently, U.S. foreign policy is working within a neo-conservative paradigm. At its core, neo-conservatism places the world into two categories: the ruling and the ruled. Neo-conservatism also provides rather ridiculous answers to legitimate questions such as why the United States invaded Iraq: ‘The regimes themselves are weapons of mass destruction.’ When President Bush took the decision to staff his foreign policy apparatus with individuals like Karl Rove and Donald Rumsfeld, he was making a foreign policy decision. Essentially, this was to be informed by a misguided view of international affairs. In reality, this view transforms into unlimited U.S. troop deployment in parallel with an unlimited spending of the U.S. budget. Global crises are seen only through the lens of the American national interest, driven on one level by an insatiable appetite for materialism. There is, in itself, nothing wrong with this. But the price is legitimacy, and for Americans legitimacy often translates into justification.

Witness the ‘war on terrorism.’ In actuality, this de facto ‘war’ is the construction of a very dangerous game with very dangerous stakes, Kissinger-esque in its approach to non-state actor threats. Dr. Kissinger, on the other hand, had the luxury of engaging a rather brilliant mind before putting perception into reaction. The policy of ‘linkage’ he espoused was fermented in a thorough strategy aimed to pacify America’s needs during the Vietnam era, and that of the international community.

In the Vietnam period, America was obliged to come to grips with its limits. For most of its history, America’s exceptionalism had proclaimed a moral superiority which was backed by the nation’s material abundance. But in Vietnam, America found itself involved in a war which became morally ambiguous, and in which America’s material superiority was largely irrelevant.

Though Kissinger was speaking for a different time and different war, the comparisons seem striking. Already, the Democratic nominee to run against President Bush is resurfacing Vietnam War ghosts in as simple a vehicle as his initials: JFK. For John Kerry’s bid to be successful, he need only tap into his predecessor’s dictum: ‘Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country.’ With this is mind, the explosion of public diplomacy efforts across the United States become a clear national reaction to the machinations of a power elite that the Bush dynasty upholds.

While the Bush Administration’s policies conceivably imbue some of the worst elements of American society, the explosion of efforts to make public diplomacy effective are an indication of the best of America’s mores and milieu. If the underlying exercise of diplomacy is to promote viable international security then public diplomacy is the most important weapon in the U.S. arsenal. However, until the foreign policy apparatus recognizes this, public diplomacy will easily become a public relations fiasco. Coca-Cola’s ingredients have not changed significantly since the removal of cocaine in 1929, America’s national identity is slightly more complex and less palatable on the tongue.

Bibliography

Abshire, David (2004), ‘Statement of Ambassador David M. Abshire, Committee on Appropriations, Public Diplomacy Programs’, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee, http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/ publicdiplomacyprograms/David_Abshire_testimony.pdf

Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769-1821), ‘Napoleon Bonaparte Quotes’, http://www.military-quotes.com/Napoleon.htm

Boot, Max (2004), ‘The Bush Doctrine Lives’, The Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/699czboz.asp

Bush, George (2002) ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

Churchill, Winston (1874-1965) ‘Winston Churchill Aphorisms’ http://www.ag.wastholm.net/aphorism/A-1250,

Djerejian, Edward (2003), Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A new strategic direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World (Washington D.C.: Advisory Group for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World)

Daalder, Ivo (2004) ‘Why Legitimacy in Iraq Matters’, The Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/daalder/20040129.htm

Daalder, Ivo & Lindsay, James (2003), ‘The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy’, The Brookings Review, Vol. 21, No. 4

Peters, Michael (2001) ‘Brand of Hope and Glory’, in (editors) Chong, Alan & Valencic, Jana The Image, the State and International Relations (London: London School of Economics and International Relations)

Kissinger, Henry (1994), Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone)

Manheim, Jarol (1994) Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Wilkinson, Rupert (1998), ‘Journeys to the American Character: Margaret Mead, David Potter and David Riesman’ in (editors) White, John and Read, Brian Americana (University of Hull Press)

Yeats, William (1865-1939) ‘The Second Coming’

http://www.well.com/

Zorthian, Barry & Burnett, Stanton (2001), ‘Public Diplomacy: How America Communicates With Others’ in (Editor) Abshire, David Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presidential Leadership (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of the Presidency)

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Recent studies and polls have shown that more than half of all people in the United States oppose gay marriage, even though three fourths otherwise support gay rights. This means that many of the same people who are even passionately in favor of gay rights oppose gays on this one issue. Those opposing gay marriage often cite numerous reasons why it will hurt our society — that it will destroy the “sanctity of marriage,” ruin traditional values, and devastate future generations through the “dismantling” of a time-honored tradition.

Obviously, the heated issue of gay marriage is often mangled into endless series of arguements brought about by those who fear its outcome the most, but when you step back and take a look at the issue of allowing two adults the same freedom to express their commitment to one another, the answer is undeniable: as humans, and as citizens of the United States, we should all have an equal opportunity to marry the one we love.

“Sanctity” is defined as “the quality or condition of being considered sacred.” Therefore, when those opposing gay marriage state that it will ruin the “sanctity” of marriage, they are saying that the “sacredness” of a traditional heterosexual marriage will be destroyed simply by allowing other couples this same right to marry. Where is the correlation between one couple’s loving marriage systematically ruining or negating the other’s pledge of commitment? This is just one point at which the issues become murky and complicated.

- What they claim instead is a new right: the right to reconfigure the conditions of marriage in such a way as to change its very definition, while denying they are doing any such thing.

- By allowing gay marriage, you would reduce the number of opposite-sex marriages that end up in the divorce courts. If it is the stability of the institution of heterosexual marriage that worries you, then consider that no one would require you or anyone else to participate in a gay marriage. You would still have freedom of choice, of choosing which kind of marriage to participate in — something more than what you have now. And speaking of divorce — to argue that the institution of marriage is worth preserving at the cost of requiring involuntary participants to remain in it is a better argument for reforming divorce laws than proscribing gay marriage.

- the younger generation becomes confused about sexual identity and quickly loses its understanding of lifelong commitments, emotional bonding, sexual purity, the role of children in a family, and from a spiritual perspective, the “sanctity” of marriage.

- people came to this country in the first place for religious freedom, yet we’re now using that as the basis to discriminate on one group of people and suddenly “going back to the bible” in a hypocritical way on this one issue, yet there isn’t this struggle against things like prayer in public school – they have “settled” that this was okay that it was done away with

- most extreme arguement againt gay marriage — that homosexuals won’t reproduce and it will lead to the downfall of society, or if they do have children, they will all turn out gay

- studies show raising biological children by gay parents doesn’t make them any more likely to be gay, same with adoption and fostering children

- Marriages are for procreation and ensuring the continuation of the species. The proponents of this argument are really hard pressed to explain, if that’s the case, why infertile couples are allowed to marry. I, for one, would love to be there when the proponent of such an argument is to explain to his post-menopausal mother or impotent father that since they cannot procreate, they must now surrender their wedding rings and sleep in separate bedrooms. That would be fun to watch! Again, such an argument fails to persuade based on the kinds of marriages society does allow routinely, without even a second thought, and why it really allows them – marriage is about love, sharing and commitment; procreation is, when it comes right down to it, in reality a purely secondary function.

The proponents of the procreation and continuation-of-the-species argument are going to have a really hard time persuading me that the human species is in any real danger of dying out anytime soon through lack of reproductive success.

Why all the passion?

It’s because there is a lot of misunderstanding about what homosexuality really is, as well as the erroneous assumption that gay people enjoy the same civil rights protections as everyone else. There are also a lot of stereotypes about gay relationships, and even a great deal of misunderstanding of what marriage itself is all about and what its purpose is.

The purpose of this essay, then, is to clear up a few of these misunderstandings and discuss some of facts surrounding gay relationships and marriage, gay and straight.

First, let’s discuss what gay relationships are really all about. The stereotype has it that gays are promiscuous, unable to form lasting relationships, and the relationships that do form are shallow and uncommitted. And gays do have such relationships!

But the important fact to note is that just like in straight society, where such relationships also exist, they are a small minority, and exist primarily among the very young. Indeed, one of the most frequent complaints of older gay men is that it is almost impossible to find quality single men to get into a relationship with, because they’re already all ‘taken!’

If you attend any gay event, such as a Pride festival or a PFLAG convention, you’ll find this to be true. As gays age and mature, just like their straight cohorts, they begin to appreciate and find their way into long-term committed relationships.

The values that such gay couples exhibit in their daily lives are often indistinguishable from those of their straight neighbors. They’re loyal to their mates, are monogamous, devoted partners. They value and participate in family life, are committed to making their neighborhoods and communities safer and better places to live, and honor and abide by the law. Many make valuable contributions to their communities, serving on school boards, volunteering in community charities, and trying to be good citizens. In doing so, they take full advantage of their relationship to make not only their own lives better, but those of their neighbors as well.

A benefit to heterosexual society of gay marriage is the fact that the commitment of a marriage means the participants are discouraged from promiscous sex. This has the advantage of slowing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, which know no sexual orientation and are equal opportunity destroyers.

These benefits of gay marriage have changed the attitudes of the majority of people in Denmark and other countries where various forms of gay marriage have been legal for years. Polling results now show that most people there now recognize that the benefits far outweigh the trivial costs, and that far from threatening heterosexual marriage, gay marriage has actually strenghtened it.

So, having established the value of gay marriage, why are people so opposed to it?

Many of the reasons offered for opposing gay marriage are based on the assumption that gays have a choice in who they can feel attracted to, and the reality is quite different. Many people actually believe that gays could simply choose to be heterosexual if they wished. But the reality is that very few do have a choice — any more than very few heterosexuals could choose which sex to find themselves attracted to.

Additionally, many people continue to believe the propaganda from right-wing religious organizations that homosexuality is about nothing but sex, considering it to be merely a sexual perversion. The reality is that homosexuality is multidimensional, and is much more about love and affection than it is about sex. And this is what gay relationships are based on — mutual attraction, love and affection. Sex, in a committed gay relationship, is merely a means of expressing that love, just the same as it is for heterosexuals. Being gay is much more profound than simply a sexual relationship; being gay is part of that person’s core indentity, and goes right the very center of his being. It’s like being black in a society of whites, or a blonde European in a nation of black-haired Asians. Yes, being gay is just that profound to the person who is. This is something that few heterosexuals can understand unless they are part of a minority themselves.

A simple civil liberty is being denied to a large group of people on the basis of religious interpretation.

- Although most Americans are indeed opposed to the legalization of same-sex marriage, large numbers of these same Americans do not consider homosexuality itself a sin, and they welcome greater tolerance for homosexuals. Favoring equality, they do not wish to see anyone denied his rights.

- custody rights, tax-free inheritance, joint ownership of property, health care and spousal citizenship, and much more

- partner benefits, life decisions, hospitals, don’t have the protections of a married couple

- married relationships are taken more seriously

-Gay relationships are immoral. Says who? The Bible? Somehow, I always thought that freedom of religion implied the right to freedom from religion as well. The Bible has absolutely no standing in American law, as was made clear by the intent of the First Amendment (and as was very explicitly stated by the founding fathers in their first treaty, the Treaty of Tripoli, in 1791) and because it doesn’t, no one has the right to impose rules anyone else simply because of something they percieve to be a moral injunction mandated by the Bible. Not all world religions have a problem with homosexuality; many sects of Buddhism, for example, celebrate gay relationships freely and would like to have the authority to make them legal marriages. In that sense, their religious freedom is being infringed. If one believes in religious freedom, the recognition that opposition to gay marriage is based on religious arguments is reason enough to discount this argument.

Denying gay couples the ability to marry is akin to the same racial discrimintion against blacks which took place throughout the 20th century.

- once we arbitrarily redefine marriage to take in couples of the same sex, what would be the stopping point? Why not legalize polygamy, even incest? This last point Sullivan himself was, in turn, quick to disparage as irrational fear-mongering, likening it to the disaster scenarios trotted out decades earlier during the debate over interracial marriage. “To the best of my knowledge,” he scoffed in reply to Bennett, “there is no polygamist’s rights organization poised to exploit same-sex marriage and return the republic to polygamous abandon.”

- why can’t we broaden and modernize our definition of marriage as we did with racial inequality?

- fear of the unknown (gay relationships) is being perpetuated, similar to the KKK’s perpetuation of white supremacy

Conclusion:

• we should judge people based on who they are, not what they are
• love doesn’t see color or race, why should gender be any different
• The US Supreme Court has declared marriage a fundamental right under the constitution.
• Without the legal right to marry, same-sex couples do not have rights like family health coverage, medical and bereavement leave, child custody, tax benefits and pension plans.
• Tradition can’t justify discriminating. Not long ago, marriage was traditionally limited to members of the same race and religion, and married women were virtually the legal property of their husbands.
• Civil and religious marriage are two separate institutions, Civil marriage binds a couple in a legal contract consisting of obligations and benefits.
• Legalizing same-sex civil marriage will not require any religion to legalize or recognize these marriages.
• The rights that married people take for granted, such as the ability to make medical decisions for an incapacitated spouse, are denied to committed lesbian and gay couples.

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Libertarianism can be defined as the belief of protecting the notion of free moral choice by denying determinism, and also that free will exists in a way that is neither causally determined or just an event that occurred randomly. Libertarians agree that moral responsibility is an important concept for society.

Determinists believe that everything has a sufficient cause. The sufficient cause is a cause, which ensures that the event in question will actually happen. Determinists also believe that the facts about the state of the universe together with the laws of nature imply the state of the universe at any given later time. Under the deterministic view, if an individual knew a great deal about the state of the universe and the laws of nature at a particular time, and if that individual also had advanced computational power, than he could predict the state of the universe in the future. Stated briefly, determinists argue that every event has a cause, and human actions are events. Therefore, human actions are all caused, so determinism must be true and exist. (Kane) “Proponents of determinism sometimes claim that free will is an illusion, and that beings are no more able to control matter with their minds than any other soulless matter (such as a robot) can. The chief objection to determinism is that a universe in which people do not really make their own choices has no morality.”

There is some evidence that supports the idea of determinism. Modern science seems to find a cause for all things eventually. Civilization continues to advance because the world operates on deterministic ideas. In everyday life, people assume that everything must have a cause. The evidence against determinism includes the idea that people know they can change simply by common sense. If individuals do not feel motivated to change, then they could act in a different way. Libertarians argue that most events in the world are determined by antecedent causes, but some events are not. The libertarian model adds the notion of the self to the equation. “Before a desire necessitates an action, the self holds the final judgment of whether to act, or not.” These events are not determined by causes that are antecedent to them. Libertarians believe that free will is the power by which events come into the world and change its progression, and free will is a power that belongs to all people. Since people can do otherwise when they make a choice of free will, they are responsible for the outcomes of those choices. Free will suggests that all of the options associated with that choice are possible. According to determinism, there is only one possible end result. (Hacking)

When asked whether humans are free or determined, most people who have not given the issue a great deal of thought will give a libertarian-type answer to the question. Libertarianism is quite a popularly accepted doctrine; and it is easy to believe because it makes the most sense to the majority of people. “It is also more attractive to believe that each person is the maker of his own future than to believe that we are all predetermined to some existence or another, for better or for worse.” (Hacking)

Strict determinists, such as Baron Holbach, see the idea of free will as an “illusion due to the determined outcomes that could be predicted by the right knowledge of the causes that affect us.” On the other hand, libertarians such as Roderick Chisholm, for example, perceive freedom as needing a self, which intervenes in the decision making process. The ideas of determinism can be further broken down into the differing notions of hard determinism and soft determinism. Under hard determinism, determinism is true and free will entails the ability to do otherwise. However, the ability to do otherwise is not compatible with determinism. Therefore, free will and determinism are incompatible and consequently there is no free will.

Under soft determinism, also known as compatibilism, determinism is true and free will is acting as one wishes, without external constraints. The issue is not whether or not actions are caused, but whether they are caused or prevented by external constraints. Therefore, determinism and free will are compatible.

Here is an example to further illustrate the differing ideas of determinism and libertarianism: Suppose you woke up on a Sunday morning and had nothing planned for the day. You decide you would like to go to the mall in the early afternoon. However, it is a warm, beautiful day outside and you might opt for the beach instead. After thinking about the two possibilities for a few minutes, you decide to head to the beach for a day of sun filled fun. After all, you can go to the mall anytime. The shopping trip will be saved for a rainy or cold day.

The Sunday afternoon example illustrates the notion of using free will.A decision was consciously made after thinking about the choices. Ifno choice was made, then free will was not used. The process people gothrough leading up to the choice is also properly considered the use offree will or volition. That process is called decision making ordeliberation. So before you chose to go to the beach for the day, you weredeciding, or deliberating. Deciding involves some degree of weighing outoptions, even there were only two options to weigh out. This exampleis consistent with the ideas of libertarianism. Using the same example, under deterministic views, there would be no choice to be made between the mall and the beach. Everything that happens is predetermined, and individuals are not in control of their fate. So, if you happened to end up at the beach on that Sunday afternoon, it was due to predetermined events or causes that you were there. You did not choose or take moral responsibility for being at the beach.

It is clear that there are inherent differences between determinism and libertarianism. More specifically, they seem to be polar opposites. The most significant factor that enters into the debate is the notion of free will. Then the question that must be asked is: Do we really have free will or not?

It is my belief that we do have free will. However, I do believe some events are predetermined. Therefore, I would side more with the libertarians. Individuals make many conscious choices every day of their lives. They make choices that are very complex and some that are so simple as the choice of what kind of cereal to have in the morning. To say that these events are predetermined is quite silly. I believe that determinism and free will both exist.

References

Hacking, Ian, The Taming of Chance, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990.

Kane, Robert, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002.

www.sandiego.edu/~janderso/free2.html

www.philosophyforum.net

plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato/

en.wikipedia.org

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